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Using new empirical measures of information leadership, we find that the role of options in price 
discovery is up to five times larger than previously thought. Approximately one-quarter of new 
information is reflected in options prices before being transmitted to stock prices, with options playing a 
more important role in price discovery around information events. Using unique data on traders 
prosecuted for insider trading, we find that they often choose to trade in options, attracted by their 
leverage, and when they do the options share of price discovery is higher. Our results help interpret 
conflicting findings in the existing literature.  
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The role of options in price discovery is at the center of an unresolved debate. Theory shows 
that under reasonable conditions, informed traders will choose to trade in both options and stocks 
(Back, 1993; Easley et al., 1998), which suggests that options can play a role in price discovery. 
The importance of this role in price discovery is an empirical question because it is a function of 
quantities that need to be measured, such as the amount of leverage and liquidity in options.
1
 
Existing empirical evidence is mixed, and even conflicting. One branch of empirical findings 
suggests that options might be important in price discovery; for example, abnormal options 
trading volume and order imbalance can predict future stock returns.
2
 In contrast, studies that 
quantify where price discovery occurs generally attribute a small or even negligible role to 
actively-traded options, finding information shares as low as 6% in recent times, which is at odds 
with the ability of options to predict future stock returns.
3
 Adding to the confusion, several 
studies find pervasive abnormal (suspicious) trading activity in options around information 
events such as takeovers, earnings announcements, and corporate actions.
4
 The evidence that 
news events are frequently preceded by abnormal trading activity in options (suggestive of 
informed trading) further indicates that information might be impounded through options 
transactions.  
                                                          
1
 Options markets are attractive for informed traders for many reasons including leverage, advanced trading 
strategies (e.g., straddles, strips, and spreads), and the ability to circumvent short-sale constraints (Black, 1975; 
Chakravarty et al., 2004; Lin and Lu, 2016; Hu, 2017).  
2
 See Manaster and Rendleman (1982), Anthony (1988), Easley et al. (1998), Pan and Poteshman (2006), Bali and 
Hovakimian (2009), Johnson and So (2012), Hu (2014), Lin and Lu (2015), and Ge et al. (2016). 
3
 See Chakravarty et al. (2004), Holowczak et al. (2006), Czerwonko et al. (2012), Muravyev et al. (2013), and 
Rourke (2013). 
4
 See Amin and Lee (1997), Cao et al. (2005), Acharya and Johnson (2010), Podolski et al. (2013), Augustin et al. 
(2014, 2015), Chan et al. (2015), Borochin and Golec (2016), Hao (2016), Berkman et al. (2017), Gharghori et al. 
(2017), and Kacperczyk and Pagnotta (2019). 
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The lack of consensus raises important questions. First, are options important in price 
discovery? Is the contribution of options to price discovery different around information events? 
How often do informed traders choose to trade in the options market and is their information 
reflected in prices? What drives informed traders’ choice of market? In this paper, we address 
each of these questions. The new evidence in this paper stems from two novel features of our 
analysis: (1) disaggregating two distinct components of price discovery, which have previously 
only been considered jointly, and (2) utilizing an extensive and unique dataset of traders 
prosecuted for insider trading.  
Building on the work of Yan and Zivot (2010), we disentangle two components of price 
discovery in the options market: (1) the relative speed at which options and stock prices reflect 
new information about fundamental value (termed “information leadership”), and (2) the relative 
amount of noise in options and stock prices. These two components are obtained by 
decomposing price movements into permanent and temporary changes. The permanent changes 
reflect innovations in the fundamental value, whereas the temporary changes occur due to 
microstructure frictions (e.g., tick size discreteness) or illiquidity (e.g., temporary price pressure 
that is reversed) and are collectively referred to as “noise.” The first component of price 
discovery indicates where information enters the market and is first reflected in prices (e.g., due 
to informed trading). This component is the focus of this paper.  
In contrast, earlier price discovery measures that have been applied to options markets such 
as Hasbrouck’s (1995) information share (IS) and Gonzalo-Granger’s (1995) component share 
(CS) capture a mix of both information leadership and the relative level of noise (Yan and Zivot, 
2010; Putniņš, 2013). In comparing options and stocks, the magnitude of noise differences 
between the markets is so large (e.g., options bid-ask spreads are approximately five times larger 
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than those of stocks) that the noise component becomes the primary driver of both IS and CS, 
obfuscating the true information leadership component in these metrics. Our central finding is 
that this obfuscation of the information leadership component due to a high level of noise in 
options prices is why options appear to make little contribution to price discovery despite 
evidence that a significant amount of informed trading occurs in options. Using new empirical 
techniques that isolate the information leadership component [the information leadership share 
(ILS) from Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš (2013)], we show that options do in fact make a 
meaningful contribution to price discovery. 
As a starting point, we use Monte Carlo simulations and empirical proxies for noise to 
analyze what the various price discovery metrics measure in our setting. We find that 
conventional measures (IS and CS) underestimate the informational role of options as a result of 
the substantially higher level of noise in options prices. This noise is caused by larger tick sizes, 
less liquidity (resulting in a greater tendency for temporary price pressure), and error in 
converting options prices to implied stock prices. The simulations show that ILS, and an 
extension we develop in this paper termed the information leadership indicator (ILI), are able to 
capture which market is the relative leader in reflecting new information. In the cases we 
consider, ILI is an approximately unbiased measure of how often a given market leads price 
discovery, and ILS measures the magnitude of the speed differential between the markets.  
Using a sample of 35 U.S. stocks with actively-traded options over a ten-year time period, 
we find that approximately one-quarter of the time new information is impounded into options 
prices first and then transmitted to stock prices (i.e., average options ILI of approximately 29%). 
This estimate is approximately two to five times larger than previously estimated using IS and 
indicates that an economically meaningful fraction of informed trading occurs in the options 
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market. The relatively low values of IS for the options market indicates that options prices are 
noisier than stock prices, not that the options market is redundant in reflecting new information.  
We draw on a unique dataset of illegal insider trading prosecutions to supplement our price 
discovery results. We hand collect every case of insider trading prosecuted by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission (SEC) during a 16-year period. We find that 29% of cases and 32% 
of illegal insider trades take place in options. When insiders trade in both the stock and options 
markets, the average volume traded in the options market is approximately 50% of their total 
traded volume. Insider trades in options earn considerably higher percentage profits. For 
example, insiders that trade only in stocks earn an average of 24%, insiders that trade in both 
stocks and options earn 39%, and insiders that only trade in options earn an average return of 
353%. The substantial number of insider trading cases that involve trading in options supports 
the notion that informed traders use options markets in addition to stock markets. 
Insider trading prosecutions provide a sample of informed trading, which we use to further 
test whether ILI and ILS capture information leadership in the two markets. We find that both the 
options market ILI and ILS, but neither IS nor CS, are significantly higher when insiders trade in 
the options market, supporting the notion that both ILI and ILS identify where information first 
enters the market and “detect” the presence of informed trade. 
We also find that the share of price discovery in options increases around information 
events. On days when price-sensitive news is released, the options ILI and ILS are higher than on 
non-news days, indicating an increase in the frequency with which options lead stocks and the 
relative speed of the options market in reflecting new information. This evidence supports the 
growing number of studies that find abnormal price and/or volume movements in options around 
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a variety of important announcements. Our evidence supports the conjecture that these abnormal 
patterns are associated with informed trading in the options market.  
Next, we investigate why informed traders choose to trade in options despite their relative 
lack of liquidity, and how their trading activity affects the options market. Theory suggests that 
leverage is one of the main features that attracts informed traders to options (e.g., Easley et al., 
1998) and our sample of insider trading prosecutions shows that without margin trading, insider 
trades in options earn much larger percentage returns than trades in stocks. We analyze how 
leverage and other factors affect informed traders’ choice of market using the options share of 
price discovery as a measure of the relative amount of informed trading in options. Our analysis 
faces an endogeneity issue with respect to liquidity; informed traders might choose in which 
market to trade on the basis of their relative liquidity and this choice is also likely to impact 
liquidity. To disentangle these effects, we exploit the exogenous reduction in options tick sizes 
(which occurred in a staggered manner over four years) as an instrument for options liquidity. 
We find that liquidity has an insignificant bearing on informed traders’ choice of market; 
however, high levels of informed trading in options decrease options liquidity, consistent with 
increased adverse selection risks. In contrast, we find that leverage draws informed traders to the 
options market and thus options with higher leverage tend to make a larger contribution to price 
discovery. 
Finally, we use an additional approach to analyzing price discovery, which is based on how 
prices adjust around episodes in which the prices in the options and stock markets disagree by a 
sufficient margin so as to imply the presence of arbitrage opportunities. Although this approach 
is quite different from the vector error correction model (VECM)-based price discovery shares, 
the results from both approaches indicate that while stocks more often lead options in reflecting 
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new information, options markets do play a role in the price discovery process. Furthermore, the 
results of both approaches are positively correlated, suggesting they agree as to when options 
make a relatively larger or smaller contribution to price discovery.   
This paper builds on a long line of research that examines the role of options in price 
discovery. The first branch, theoretical studies, model how and why traders might use options 
(e.g., Easley et al., 1998). The second branch examines lead-lag relations between options and 
stocks in terms of returns and volumes, order flow, and implied volatility (e.g., Ge et al., 2016). 
The third branch uses price discovery measures such as IS and CS, producing options price 
discovery estimates as low as 6% for stocks with active options in more recent sample periods 
(e.g., Muravyev et al., 2013). The fourth branch examines abnormal patterns in options returns, 
volumes, and implied-volatility around corporate announcements (e.g., Berkman et al., 2017). 
 
2. Data and characteristics of the sample 
We employ two samples. The first is 35 large U.S. stocks listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ 
selected on the basis of having the highest options trading volume in March 2003. This sample 
spans from April 17, 2003 to April 17, 2013. The second sample, described in more detail in 
Subsection 4.3, is obtained from prosecuted cases of illegal insider trading in the U.S. It 
comprises 36 stocks and spans from January 1, 1999 to August 30, 2014.  
We obtain intraday trade and quote data for both stocks and options from the Thomson 
Reuters Tick History (TRTH) database provided by the Securities Industry Research Centre of 
Asia-Pacific (SIRCA).
 
In our calculation of price discovery measures, we use the National Best 
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Bid and Offer (NBBO) consolidated quotes for both the stock and options markets.
5
 We measure 
price discovery from midquote prices to minimize the effects of bid-ask bounce. This approach is 
consistent with the price discovery literature and empirical evidence indicating that the bulk of 
price discovery occurs through quotes not trades (e.g., Hasbrouck, 1991; Brogaard et al., 2019). 
We use intraday data to estimate price discovery measures for each stock-day. Thereafter, 
we use stock-days as the units of observation. We apply the following criteria to select valid put-
call pairs for each stock-day: 
(a) Time to maturity (in days) is between one and 70 calendar days (inclusive), 
(b) Present value of dividends with ex-dividend dates during the remaining life of the option 
is less than $0.05, and 
(c) Bid price of the option is greater than or equal to $0.15.6 
If there are more than three valid put-call pairs on a given stock-day, we retain only the three 
pairs with the highest quoting activity.
7
  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics about the activity, liquidity, and leverage of the options 
and stocks in our sample. The mean time-weighted quoted bid-ask spread (in dollars) for valid 
put-call options pairs is almost seven times larger than stock spreads, despite lower options 
prices. Options trading and quoting activity is also lower than that of stocks. Summing across our 
                                                          
5
 We do not calculate price discovery metrics when the market is closed in which case midquote prices, spreads, and 
volume are not meaningful. Dividend information is obtained from CRSP and the continuously compounded risk-
free rate is obtained from OptionMetrics. 
6
 The purpose of criterion (b) is to reduce the early exercise premium for American call options. This criterion does 
not remove many stock-days because during the sample period dividends are infrequent and/or mostly less than 
$0.05. 
7
 The reason for limiting the analysis to a maximum of three put-call pairs per stock-day is that the incremental 
contribution to price discovery of options beyond that of the three most active pairs is likely to be negligible, and 
joint estimation of the price discovery measures across multiple put-call pairs becomes exponentially 
computationally difficult with the number of pairs (due to the need to consider all possible orderings of the prices). 




)| ≤ 6% (where 𝑆 is the stock price and 𝐾 is the option strike price) and two away-from-the-money 
pairs (one with 𝑆 > 𝐾, the other with 𝑆 < 𝐾) satisfying 6% ≤ |ln (
𝑆
𝐾
)| ≤ 18%. 
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sample of options on each stock-day (up to three put-call pairs per stock-day), the average 
omega-adjusted dollar volume in options per stock-day is approximately 2% of the stock dollar 
volume ($10,397,000/$570,401,000).
8
 Because our sample includes only a subset of the most 
liquid/active options contracts each stock-day, the options volume that we report is a lower 
bound. Despite this, it is clear that there is considerably less volume in options than stocks. The 
average number of options quote changes per stock-day (summing across put-call pairs) is 
around one-quarter (25.49%) of the corresponding number in stocks.  
 
< Table 1 here > 
 
The combination of wider bid-ask spreads and lower trading activity in options indicates that 
options are considerably less liquid than stocks. Therefore options prices are likely to be noisier, 
impacting the second component of price discovery. Options leverage is measured by omega: the 
absolute options delta multiplied by the ratio of the stock price to the option price. The leverage 
in options is clearly evident from the descriptive statistics; average stock prices are 
approximately 24 times larger than average options prices and the average option omega is 
15.90.  
 
                                                          
8
 To compare options volume with that of the stock market, we have to convert options volume into the same “units” 
as stock volume, recognizing that because of the leverage in options, one dollar of options gives a much greater risk 
exposure than one dollar of stocks. Suppose there is an option with a delta of one trading at a price of $2 when the 
stock trades at $100. Every $2 of options volume has the equivalent dollar exposure as $100 of stock volume (when 
stocks increase by $1, the options position changes by $1 and so does the stock position). Therefore, options volume 
would have to be scaled up by $100/$2 = 50 times to make it comparable to stock volume. If instead (more 
realistically) the option delta is say 0.5, then every $2 of options volume has half (delta times) the dollar exposure of 
$100 of stock volume (when stocks increase by $1, the options position changes by $1 × 0.5), so options volume 
would have to be scaled up by $100 × 0.5/$2 = 25 times. This example illustrates that to convert options dollar 
volume to the stock equivalent in terms of dollar exposure, the options volume has to be multiplied by delta times 




3.1. Options-implied stock price 
Following Muravyev et al. (2013), we begin with the European put-call parity relation to 
calculate the options-implied stock price for a given put-call pair,  
𝑆𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) − 𝑃𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) + 𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝐷(𝑡, 𝑇)) + 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡),          (1) 
where 𝑆𝑡 is the stock price at time 𝑡, 𝐶𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) and 𝑃𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) are the call and put option prices with 
strike price 𝐾 and expiry date 𝑇, 𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝐷(𝑡, 𝑇)) is the present value of cash dividends at time 𝑡, 𝑟 
is the continuously compounded risk-free rate of interest per annum, and 𝑇– 𝑡 is the time to 
maturity.
9
 We adjust equation (1) to incorporate the ability to exercise early because our sample 
consists of American-style options. Denoting the early exercise premium by 𝑣𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇), we have: 
𝑆𝑡 +  𝑣𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) = 𝐶𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) − 𝑃𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) + 𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝐷(𝑡, 𝑇)) + 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡).                   (2) 
We calculate 𝑣𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) by first estimating the error from the put-call parity relation at every quote 
update: 
𝑡 = 𝐶𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) − 𝑃𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) + 𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝐷(𝑡, 𝑇)) + 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) − 𝑆𝑡.              (3) 
The early exercise premium is then calculated as the average error term for each stock-day: 





.                (4) 
Recognizing that we can replicate a stock position using options contracts, we can rewrite 
equation (2) in terms of the options-implied bid price and options-implied ask price at time 𝑡: 
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) = 𝐶𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑑(𝐾, 𝑇) − 𝑃𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑘(𝐾, 𝑇) + 𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝐷(𝑡, 𝑇)) + 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) − 𝑣𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇)    (5) 
                                                          
9
 There are a variety of methods for computing the options-implied stock price. Chakravarty et al. (2004) use the 
binomial model. Holowczak et al. (2006), Muravyev et al. (2013), and Rourke (2013) use put-call parity. The put-
call parity approach has the advantages that it is model-free, relying only on the law-of-one-price or absence of 
arbitrage, it uses observable parameters only, and it incorporates information from both call and put prices.  
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   𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝐴𝑠𝑘𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) = 𝐶𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑘(𝐾, 𝑇) − 𝑃𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑑(𝐾, 𝑇) + 𝑃𝑉𝑡(𝐷(𝑡, 𝑇)) + 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟(𝑇−𝑡) − 𝑣𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇).  
(6) 
3.2. Price discovery measures 
Commonly-used empirical measures of price discovery include Hasbrouck’s (1995) 
information share (IS) and Gonzalo and Granger’s (1995) component share (CS). Both measures 
are based on decomposing price changes into permanent components (innovations in the 
fundamental value) and temporary components (noise). The temporary price changes arise from 
microstructure frictions, such as tick discreteness and illiquidity, which give rise to short term 
pricing errors that are subsequently reversed. IS decomposes the variance of innovations in the 
common efficient price and attributes a share of the variance to each price series. CS is the 
normalized weight of the price series in the linear combination of prices that forms the common 
efficient price. In essence, IS is a variance-weighted version of CS. Both IS and CS are calculated 
from the parameter estimates and reduced form errors of a vector error correction model 
(VECM) or equivalent vector moving average model (VMA). The IS and CS measures are 
improvements on prior lead-lag methods, which do not take into account the cointegration of 
stock and options prices and do not separate temporary and permanent price changes. 
Recent research points out what these price discovery metrics measure and how they differ. 
Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš (2013) separate price discovery into two components: (1) the 
relative speed with which a price reflects new information (innovations in the efficient price), 
and (2) the relative noise in a price series. A price series can be superior to another in the first 
component only, the second component only, both components, or neither component. Empirical 
price discovery studies typically aim to measure the first component, relative speed or 
information leadership, because this component identifies where information enters the market 
12 
 
and is first reflected in prices. However, as Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš (2013) show, IS 
and CS in fact measure a mix of the two components, often placing considerable weight on the 
second component, relative noise. Somewhat worryingly, a market that is unambiguously the 
first to reflect new information about the efficient price (and therefore the leader in price 
discovery) can have a lower IS and CS than a related market that is a price follower if the first 
market has noisier prices (e.g., less liquidity or a larger tick size). Differences in noise can mask 
information leadership when using IS and CS to measure price discovery. 
Yan and Zivot (2010) show that IS and CS can be combined in a way that isolates leadership 
in impounding new information and removes the influence of noise. This is because IS and CS 
measure both components of price discovery but in different ratios, so the correct combination of 
these measures can cancel out their dependence on relative noise.
10
 This is analogous to 
combining two stocks with different betas into a portfolio—with the correct weights, market risk 
can be purged from the portfolio. Using this approach, Putniņš (2013) defines the information 
leadership share (ILS), which seeks to isolate the relative speed with which a price series reflects 
new information. ILS is easy to interpret and is directly comparable to IS and CS because it takes 
the range [0,1] indicating the “share” of price discovery attributable to a given price series. When 
comparing two series, values above 0.5 indicate that the price series leads in price discovery.  
Because IS and ILS by construction lie in the interval [0,1], in finite noisy samples their 
expected values will be biased inward from the endpoints of the interval. This occurs due to 
truncation of the sampling error distribution. To correct for the bias away from zero and one, we 
define a fourth measure of price discovery, the information leadership indicator (ILI). ILI, unlike 
                                                          
10



























|, where IS is found to be a function of the relative speed at which a price reflects new information 
(IL) and the relative noise in the price series (N), and CS is found to be a function of N only. The cross-
multiplication of IL and N results in a metric that captures information leadership only. 
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the other “shares,” is a binary measure equal to one if 𝐼𝐿𝑆 > 0.5 and zero otherwise. Being based 
on ILS, ILI embeds Yan and Zivot’s (2010) approach to isolating the information leadership 
component of price discovery. However, unlike ILS it is not constrained in its ability to take 
values of zero or one. ILI exploits the fact that ILS is unbiased around 0.5, that is, when one 
market is faster than the other, its expected ILS is greater than 0.5 irrespective of the level of 
noise (Putniņš, 2013), which is not the case for IS or CS. Intuitively, ILS identifies the leader 
correctly on average but understates the contribution of the leader, whereas ILI takes the leader 
identified by ILS and assigns full credit for the leadership. Put simply, there are two forms of 
bias in IS and CS caused by noise: (1) bias towards zero for the noisier market and (2) bias 
inwards from the zero/one endpoints. ILS corrects for the first form of bias, while ILI corrects for 
both forms of bias.  
In simulations below, we show that ILI is an approximately unbiased measure of information 
leadership, even in finite noisy samples. When the binary ILI is averaged across multiple stock-
days, it becomes a “share,” indicating the proportion of stock-days in which options lead stocks. 
When used in such a way, ILI still displays good finite sample properties. 
We estimate the price discovery measures for each stock-day. A stock-day can have up to 
three valid put-call pairs, producing up to three options-implied stock prices in addition to the 
actual stock price. We estimate the options price discovery measures by jointly considering the 
price discovery that occurs in all of the valid put-call pairs. Consequently, we use the multiple-
market implementations of the IS and CS metrics and derive the multiple-market extensions of 
ILS and ILI. Below we present the approach for four prices (one stock price and three options-
implied stock prices), noting that the approach is similar for stock-days with only one, two, or N 
valid put-call pairs. 
14 
 
Each stock-day, we estimate a reduced-form VECM of log stock midquote prices (𝑝1,𝑡) and 
log options-implied stock midquote prices (𝑝2,𝑡 to 𝑝4,𝑡), with 200 lags (prices are sampled at one-
second intervals during continuous trading (09:45AM to 3:45PM)): 
∆𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑍𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖∆𝑝𝑡−𝑖 + 𝑒𝑡
200
𝑖=1 ,         (7) 
where ∆𝑝𝑡 is the 4 × 1 midquote return vector, 𝛼 is the 4 × (4 − 1) matrix of error correction 
coefficients, 𝑍𝑡−1 is the 4 × 1 co-integrating vector, 𝑏𝑖 is the 4 × 4 coefficient matrix for lag 𝑖, 
and 𝑒𝑡 is the 4 × 1 vector of residuals. Sampling quotes in one-second intervals is consistent with 
the literature and also finds support in our empirical analysis as an appropriate frequency.
11
  
We calculate 𝐼𝑆1 to 𝐼𝑆4, and 𝐶𝑆1 to 𝐶𝑆4, from the VECM estimates using an approach 
equivalent to Hasbrouck (1995) and Gonzalo and Granger (1995) and detailed in Appendix A. 
Market 𝑖’s propensity to reflect new information (how much market 𝑖’s price responds to an 
innovation in the efficient price) is given by the ratio 𝛽𝑖 = 𝐼𝑆𝑖/𝐶𝑆𝑖 (Yan and Zivot, 2010). 





























2.   
(8) 
From ILS, we compute ILI as follows: 
   𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖 = { 
1        if     𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖 > 𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑘   ∀  𝑘 ≠ 𝑖
0                otherwise                        
.    (9) 
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 Using a one-second sampling frequency and 200 lags in the VECM is similar to previous studies (Chakravarty et 
al., 2004; Czerwonko et al., 2012; Muravyev et al., 2013). In support of using a one-second sampling frequency, we 
subsequently show using cross-correlations of stock and options midquote returns that options lead stocks in 
reflecting new information by up to ten seconds (see Figure 1). The high sampling frequency (one-second) is 
required to reduce contemporaneous correlation between the price series, which arises due to time aggregation. If 
contemporaneous correlation between prices is an issue, we will observe a wide spread between the upper and lower 
bounds of our information share estimates (Baillie et al., 2002). The actual bounds that we estimate are relatively 
narrow, again suggesting that the one-second resolution of the data is sufficiently granular for attributing 
information shares.  
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The options price discovery shares are the sum of the price discovery shares of the options-
implied stock prices. For example, the options IS is given by the sum of 𝐼𝑆2 to 𝐼𝑆4, while the 
stock’s price discovery share is 𝐼𝑆1 (equal to one minus the options price discovery share). The 
options CS, ILS, and ILI are obtained in a similar manner.  
Throughout the paper we report and analyze the price discovery measures for the options 
market (the stock market measures are just one minus the option market measure). We scale up 
all of the price discovery measures to the range 0–100%. The IS and CS results are qualitatively 
similar throughout the paper and Internet Appendix. Given that IS is more frequently used than 
CS, for brevity we focus our analysis on the differences between ILS/ILI and IS. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. What components of price discovery do the empirical metrics capture? 
Before using the price discovery measures to quantify the role of options in price discovery, 
we analyze to what extent they measure information leadership versus relative noise in the 
specific setting of stock and options markets. We start with Monte Carlo simulations using 
several different structural models calibrated to our empirical setting, and then turn to the 
empirical data. In all specifications, we find that ILI has good finite sample properties and 
provides an (approximately) unbiased measure of which market leads in price discovery using 
samples of similar size and noise as the empirical data. As a continuous measure, ILS picks up on 
the magnitude of the speed differential between the two markets. We find that the difference 
between IS and both ILI/ILS is due to the sensitivity of IS to the relative noise (illiquidity) 
between the two markets, consistent with Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš (2013).  
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The details of the baseline Monte Carlo simulations are in Appendix B.1 and simulations of 
a number of different structural models are reported in the Internet Appendix (Section 2). Here 
we provide a summary of the baseline simulations and results.  
We simulate the fundamental value of the stock as a geometric Brownian motion with 
parameters matching those of a typical U.S. stock. We assume the actual stock price tracks the 
fundamental value with a delay of 𝛿1 periods and with a fixed level of noise (pricing errors 
caused by illiquidity, price discreteness, and so on). We further assume that call and put prices 
follow the Black-Scholes model, tracking the fundamental value with some other delay 𝛿2 and 
noise drawn from 𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠2). By construction, some days (a fraction 𝑞) options lead stocks 
(𝛿1 > 𝛿2) and other days (fraction (1 − 𝑞)) stocks lead options (𝛿1 < 𝛿2). We vary the parameter 
𝑞 across simulations so that options lead stocks in price discovery from none of the time (𝑞 = 0) 
through to all of the time (𝑞 = 1). We also vary the noise in options prices (𝜎𝑠2) across 
simulations (holding the noise in stock prices fixed) to assess the impact of the relative amount 
of noise in the two markets. For each set of parameter values, we simulate 5,000 samples of data 
(each sample corresponding to a day), estimate the options price discovery measures for each 
sample, and compute the averages across the 5,000 samples.  
Table 2 reports the results of the simulations. Across rows we vary the amount of time that 
options lead stocks in price discovery, from 𝑞 = 0 (none of the time) to 𝑞 = 1 (all of the time). 
Across columns we vary the amount of noise in options prices relative to stock prices. Bold 
numbers indicate options price discovery estimates that are greater than 50%.  
If the price discovery metrics measure which market impounds new information first 
irrespective of differences in relative noise levels, we would see no bold numbers in the top half 
of each 11 × 6 grid (where 𝑞 < 0.5, meaning options usually follow stocks in reflecting new 
17 
 
information) and bold numbers all throughout the bottom half of the grid (where 𝑞 > 0.5, 
meaning options usually lead stocks). Table 2 shows that only options ILS and ILI (Panels B and 
C) satisfy this property and have expected values greater than (less than) 50% when options lead 
(do not lead) stocks. In contrast, Panel A shows that IS takes low values overall, failing to 
recognize the informational role of options even when by construction (in the simulated data) 
options are usually the first to reflect new information (bottom half of grids). The low values of 
IS result from its downward bias for the noisier price (in this case options) consistent with Yan 
and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš (2013). In settings where both markets have similar levels of noise, 




Further, if a price discovery measure provides an unbiased estimate of the proportion of time 
(e.g., fraction of days) that options lead stocks in price discovery, its expected value will be equal 
to the parameter 𝑞, which we vary across rows. Table 2 shows that only ILI satisfies this property 
and provides an (approximately) unbiased measure of price discovery in our setting, irrespective 
of the level of noise. We therefore focus on ILI when quantifying how often options lead stocks 
in price discovery. 
A useful feature of ILS is that (unlike ILI) it provides information about the magnitude of the 
speed differential between two markets. In additional simulations (reported in Table IA.2b of the 
Internet Appendix), rather than varying the proportion of time that options lead stocks (𝑞), we 
vary the magnitude of the speed differential between the markets, 𝛿1 − 𝛿2. The simulations show 
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 Table 2 shows that IS is influenced by both information leadership and relative noise—holding relative noise 
fixed, options IS decreases when options lead stocks less often (moving vertically up through the grid), and holding 
information leadership fixed, IS decreases when there is more noise in options prices (moving horizontally across 
the grid from left to right). We confirm that the low values of IS (all less than 50%) are due to the high level of noise 
in options prices by repeating the simulations with considerably lower levels of noise in options prices [using the 
same levels of noise as stock prices, i.e., 𝜎𝑠2 ∈ {0,1, … ,10} basis points] and find that options IS is much higher 
overall, with approximately half the values above 50%. 
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that options ILS takes larger values when options lead by a larger margin, whereas ILI has an 
expected value close to 100% whenever options lead by even the narrowest of margins. In fact, 
the ILS of a market that leads price discovery approaches 100% as the speed differential (number 
of periods by which the market leads) becomes large. We therefore report both ILS and ILI 
throughout the paper (and IS for comparison), noting they measure different quantities—ILI 
being an approximately unbiased measure of the proportion of time that options lead stocks, 
whereas ILS measures the magnitude of the speed differential. 
We show that our findings are not unique to the structural models described in this section; a 
range of different simulated structural models support the conclusions above about the 
components of price discovery captured by IS, ILS, and ILI. The additional simulation results are 
reported in Table IA.2a of the Internet Appendix and include the structural models used in 
Hasbrouck (2002) and Grammig and Peter (2013). The various alternative structural models 
differ to those described above in the following ways: (i) price discovery takes place through 
trading on private information, (ii) the fundamental value has a public information component as 
well as a private information component, (iii) the fundamental value is driven by the level of 
market volatility, (iv) the noise of each price series is serially correlated, and (v) speed 
differentials between markets are varied. 
 
< Table 2 here > 
 
Next, we test whether noise impacts the price discovery metrics in the empirical data in a 
similar manner to what it does in the simulations. According to the analytical results of Yan and 
Zivot (2010) and our simulations, IS underestimates options price discovery due to the higher 
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level of noise in options prices. If this is true, we should see the difference between ILI and IS 
increase with the relative magnitude of noise in options prices. To test this, we estimate several 
proxies for the level of noise in the stock and options prices. The first set of noise proxies are 
calculated as the average absolute deviation of prices from the estimated common efficient price 
(see Appendix B.2 for details). We sort stock-days into deciles of the differential (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡), 
and for each decile we compute the mean 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 (the ratio of options price noise 
to the sum of options and stock price noise).  
Panel A in Table 3 reports the results. As expected, the difference between ILI and IS is 
positively related to the relative amount of noise in options prices; 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 
increases almost monotonically from 0.52 in the first decile of (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) to 1.00 in the ninth 
and tenth deciles. We observe the opposite relation between (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) and 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 (the ratio of stock price noise to the sum of options and stock price noise). 
This evidence is consistent with our simulation results and the analytical results in Yan and Zivot 
(2010), that higher levels of noise in options prices cause IS to underestimate how often options 
are the first to impound new information.  
Multivariate regressions support the conclusion that the more noise there is in options prices, 
the larger the downward bias in the options IS, creating a larger wedge between the options 
market ILI and IS. We regress (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) on our measure of relative noise 
(𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡) and several control variables including dummy variables for the removal 
of the grandfathering provision and the options market maker (OMM) exemption (𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹  and 
𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀), a time trend (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡), and stock fixed effects.
13
 Model 1 in Panel B of Table 3, shows 
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 The removal of the grandfathering provision and OMM exemption were a part of Regulation SHO. Regulation 
SHO was introduced on January 3, 2005 to restrict naked short-selling of stocks unless the broker could locate or 
make arrangements to borrow the stock and deliver to the buyer by the delivery date. If the seller does not borrow 
the stock in time to close out their position the seller fails to deliver (see Putniņš, 2010). The grandfathering 
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there is a statistically significant positive relation between (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) and 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡. A one percentage point increase in 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 is associated 
with a 1.84 percentage point increase in the spread between ILI and IS. The results are robust to 
variants of this noise measure: 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 and 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑡𝑑𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 (see Appendix B.2 for 
definitions).  
 
< Table 3 here > 
 
The results are also robust to other model-free measures of relative noise that do not rely on 
estimating the common efficient price. For example, in Model 2 we use the bid-ask spread in the 
options market normalized by the sum of the options and stock spreads (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡) and in 
Model 3 we use the options market tick size also normalized by the sum of the options and stock 
tick sizes (𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡). Across all measures, more noise in options consistently leads to a 
larger downward bias in the options IS (this downward bias is also present in CS). We obtain 
similar results if we replace the (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) differential with the (𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) differential 
(reported in Table IA.3 of the Internet Appendix). 
 
4.2. Price discovery in the stock and options markets 
The previous subsection shows that ILI is an approximately unbiased measure of which 
market is the first to reflect new information in a variety of scenarios, while IS exhibits a 
downward bias for the noisier market (options). ILS measures the magnitude of the speed 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
provision for naked short sales was removed on October 15, 2007. The grandfathering provision allowed brokers to 
naked short-sell the underlying stock, creating fail-to-deliver positions up until the stock got placed on a threshold 
list. The removal of the options market maker (OMM) exemption occurred on September 17, 2008. This exemption 
allowed OMMs to hedge options positions by naked short selling the underlying stock.  
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differential between the markets, approaching 100% only when a market is much faster. In this 
subsection, we estimate the price discovery measures on our sample to quantify the role of 
options in price discovery and examine the extent to which conventional measures underestimate 
price discovery in options.  
Panel A in Table 4 reports the means and medians of options price discovery across the 
54,714 stock-days in our sample of 35 large stocks with actively-traded options during a ten-year 
period. Consistent with prior studies, the stock market is the dominant venue for price 
discovery—the mean IS, ILS, and ILI estimates for options are 11.84%, 36.75%, and 28.94%, 
respectively.
14
 Given what our simulations reveal about the properties of the price discovery 
measures, the interpretation of ILI is the most straightforward: 28.94% of the time new 
information is impounded into options prices first and then transmitted to stock prices. The 
bootstrapped 95% confidence interval for the mean ILI estimate is (25.90%, 44.58%), indicating 
a high degree of confidence that options lead stocks on a considerable fraction of stock-days—
one-quarter of stock-days at the lower end of the confidence interval and close to one-half at the 
upper end.  
The mean estimates of IS are approximately two times smaller than ILI, consistent with the 
fact that noisier options prices cause a downward bias in option IS. This result is consistent with 
both our simulations and our empirical analysis of what explains the difference between ILI and 
IS. The mean ILS estimate of 36.75% indicates that the average speed differential between the 
two markets is small, on the order of one to two periods (seconds) in favor of stocks.
15
 The speed 
                                                          
14
 We obtain similar results if we estimate price discovery between the stock price and one option price series and 
calculate the pooled means across put-call pairs: options IS, ILS, and ILI are 5.59%, 41.01%, and 38.20%, 
respectively. 
15
 This conclusion is based on the simulations reported in Table IA.2b of the Internet Appendix in which we vary the 
speed differential between the markets. An ILS of 36.75% falls between the row where options and stocks have 
equal speed and the row where stocks lead options by two periods.  
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differential is not constant; ILI indicates that one-quarter of the time, the differential is in favor 
of options and three-quarters of the time it is in favor of stocks (average ILS gives the average 
speed differential). 
 
< Table 4 here > 
 
Temporarily digressing from the price discovery metrics, to get a further sense of the speed 
differentials between the markets, we examine simple lead-lag cross-correlations between the 
markets on stock-days when options lead (𝐼𝐿𝐼 = 1 = 100%) compared to stock-days when 
stocks lead (𝐼𝐿𝐼 = 0 = 0%). Figure 1 shows the cross-correlations (vertical axis), computed as 
the correlation of one-second midquote returns, 𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 and 𝑟𝑡+𝑙
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁, for each of the lead/lag 
values (on the horizontal axis) 𝑙 = −10, −9, … , +9, +10. For example, the cross-correlation 
difference at lag 𝑙 = −1 of 0.007 (with associated 𝑡-statistic of 10) indicates that the average 
correlation between 𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾 and 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is 0.007 higher when options lead than when stocks 
lead, and the difference is statistically significant. The cross-correlation difference is larger when 
we instead compare 1,000 of the 𝐼𝐿𝐼 = 1 stock-days that have the highest ILS, and 1,000 of the 
𝐼𝐿𝐼 = 0 stock-days that have the lowest ILS (see Figure IA.1 of the Internet Appendix). For 
example, the cross-correlation difference at lag 𝑙 = −1 is 0.031 (with a 𝑡-statistic of 12). The 
distinct pattern in Figure 1 indicates that when 𝐼𝐿𝐼 = 1, options lead stocks by one to ten seconds 
on average. ILS and ILI differ from the simple lead-lag illustration in Figure 1 in that these 
measures focus only on permanent price changes (not temporary ones) and aggregate leadership 




< Figure 1 here > 
 
Returning to the price discovery metrics in Table 4, our estimate that options prices lead 
stock prices about one-quarter of the time is between two to five times larger than previously 
measured using IS.
16
 Our larger estimates indicate that a meaningful fraction of price discovery 
occurs in the options market, consistent with theoretical models and a significant empirical 
literature reporting informed trading in options. Most of the difference compared to previous 
studies comes from the fact that ILI corrects the downward bias in IS. However, a second 
methodological difference is that we jointly consider price discovery across multiple options (up 
to three put-call pairs per stock-day), whereas prior studies examine price discovery in individual 
options or single put-call pairs [an exception being Rourke (2013)]. 
The differences between the upper and lower bounds of IS (denoted as UML) are fairly small 
(mean of 1.74%), indicating that the sampling frequency is sufficiently high to reliably attribute 
price discovery to each price series and avoid excessive contemporaneous correlation. If options 
and stock prices simultaneously reflect new information (which can arise when the sampling 
frequency is too low relative to the speed of price adjustment), this would manifest as a wide 
spread between the upper and lower bound estimates of IS.  
The pooled means of the price discovery measures are higher than their medians, suggesting 
the distribution of options price discovery is right-skewed (Table 4, Panel A). This is consistent 
with the notion that on a small proportion of stock-days (e.g., days on which important news is 
released), options make a very large contribution to price discovery, while on the majority of 
                                                          
16
 Chakravarty et al. (2004) find that near-the-money options have an IS of 17% between 1988 and 1992. Holowczak 
et al. (2006) and Muravyev et al. (2013) find that the options IS is approximately 11% during 2002 and 6.25% 
between 2003 and 2006, respectively. Rourke (2013) considers options IS jointly across multiple strike prices and 
obtains an estimate of 17% between 2007 and 2008. 
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stock-days (e.g., non-informational stock-days), options make a considerably smaller 
contribution to price discovery. In subsequent sections we investigate the role of options around 
information events and find support for this conjecture. 
Panel B in Table 4 reports the standard deviations of the price discovery estimates across the 
full sample of stock-days (𝜎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙). The standard deviations are large; for example, 𝜎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =
40.56% for ILS and 𝜎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 = 45.17% for ILI. There are two sources of this variation: (1) 
sampling error in estimating the price discovery measures, and (2) true variation in price 
discovery across stock-days, which could be variation through time, variation across stocks, or 
both. To understand what drives the high standard deviations of ILS and ILI estimates, we 
decompose the standard deviations into sampling variation (𝜎 ) and variation in price discovery 
(𝜎𝑃𝐷). Assume that a price discovery estimate on a given stock-day is the sum of the true price 
discovery value and an error, 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷 = 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 + 𝑖𝑡. It follows that: 
 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸) + 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡) + 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 , 𝑖𝑡).  (10) 
We observe 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷); it is the square of the standard deviation of the price discovery 
point estimates (𝜎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙
2 ). We estimate 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡) from the bootstrap applied to each stock-day 
(details of the bootstrap are in Appendix A), taking the variance of the distribution of sampling 
errors. The third term, 2𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 , 𝑖𝑡), is zero for unbiased measures of price discovery. 
Therefore, for the approximately unbiased ILI, we can rearrange equation (10) to obtain 
𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡). Performing this decomposition and converting 
the variance terms to standard deviations, we find that most of the total variation in ILI (𝜎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 =
45.17%) is due to true variation in information leadership (𝜎𝑃𝐷 = 44.93%), with only a 
relatively small contribution from estimation/sampling error (𝜎 = 4.67%). 
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In decomposing the variance of IS, we know from our simulations that they underestimate 
options price discovery and the magnitude of the negative error term increases with 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸, 
implying 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 , 𝑖𝑡) < 0. Therefore, for IS, 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸) > 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷) −
𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡) and thus √𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑀𝐸𝐴𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝐷) − 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 𝑖𝑡)
̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  (which we label 𝜎𝑃𝐷) gives a lower bound of 
the true variation in information leadership. Consistent with that notion, we obtain considerably 
lower estimates of 𝜎𝑃𝐷 = 8.81% for IS. From the simulations, we can infer that for ILS, 
𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 , 𝑖𝑡) is also negative but smaller in magnitude than for IS. Consistent with this 
notion, 𝜎𝑃𝐷 obtained from ILS (39.89%) is closer to the true 𝜎𝑃𝐷 obtained from ILI.
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We examine the extent of variation in price discovery separately across stocks and through 
time. Panel C in Table 4 reports mean price discovery estimates by ticker. There is a moderate 
level of cross-sectional variation; the means for different stocks range between 7.94%–18.41% 
for IS, 21.44%–52.18% for ILS, and 13.88%–47.12% for ILI.  
The time series of options price discovery estimates provides insight on the effects of 
institutional changes in stock and options markets. In Figure 2, we plot the mean IS, ILS, and ILI 
through time. Options ILS and ILI exhibit similar trends throughout the sample period. The 
options ILI (solid double line) increases from around 30% in 2003 to 40% in 2007. The increase 
coincides with increased options trading volume (relative to stock volume) over this period. 
Figure IA.3 in the Internet Appendix shows that options trading volume (solid black line) grew at 
a rate of four times the growth in stock trading volume (dotted line) during the period 2003–
2007. The rapid growth in options trading volume corresponds with the multi-listing of options 
                                                          
17
 If we instead consider IS and ILS as measures of different aspects of price discovery rather than biased measures 
of information leadership (implying the term 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸  is the mix of information leadership and noise in the case of 
IS, and a measure of the speed differential in the case of ILS), then 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑅𝑈𝐸 , 𝑖𝑡) = 0 because IS and ILS are 
unbiased measures of themselves. Viewed this way, the results show that there is more variation in the information 
leadership component of price discovery (i.e., 𝜎𝑃𝐷 for ILI and ILS) than an aggregate of information leadership and 
relative avoidance of noise (i.e., 𝜎𝑃𝐷 for IS). 
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across different exchanges, the introduction of the International Securities Exchange in 2000 and 
the Boston Option Exchange in 2004, the introduction of electronic option trading platforms, and 
increased market volatility. Additionally, the removal of the grandfathering provision on October 
15, 2007 is likely to have increased the use of options to create synthetic short positions. 
 
< Figure 2 here > 
 
Figure 2 shows that between 2007 and 2013, the options ILI declines to approximately 20%. 
This decline coincides with several institutional changes. The first is the removal of the short 
sales uptick rule on July 6, 2007, making it easier to execute short sales, potentially reducing the 
use of options to take bearish positions.
18
 The second is the removal of the OMM exemption on 
September 17, 2008, which increased the cost of short selling for OMMs, likely reducing options 
market liquidity and price discovery. The third is increased fragmentation in the options market, 
both across a larger number of venues and number of contracts, as well as via an increased use of 
autoquotation algorithms. For example, the introduction of the C2 options exchange and weekly 
contract expiry dates in 2010, and the launch of NASDAQ OMX BX and MIAX option 
exchanges in 2012. For the stocks in our sample, Figure 2 shows that the mean number of put-
call pairs per stock at a given point in time satisfying the criteria in Section 2 (solid grey line) 
increases from around 5 to 12 between 2007 and 2013.  
In summary, the results in this section indicate that options play a more important role in 
price discovery than previously thought; approximately one-quarter of the time new information 
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 The uptick rule restricts short selling to the following circumstances: (i) on an uptick (at a price greater than the 
last traded price), or (ii) on a zero-plus tick (at the last traded price if the last trade was made on an uptick). We do 
not include a dummy variable for the removal of the uptick rule in our regressions because it occurs close to the time 




is reflected in options prices before being transmitted to stock prices. Using ILI, this estimate is 
several times larger than the options IS documented in prior studies. Our simulations and 
empirical analysis of the price discovery metrics show that the relatively high level of noise in 
options prices masks their role in impounding new information in measures such as IS.  
 
4.3. Insider trading prosecutions 
Given the evidence that options lead stocks in impounding new information approximately 
one-quarter of the time, next we examine the drivers of this informational role. We analyze how 
often informed traders choose to trade in the options market and what effect this choice has on 
the information reflected in prices. For this we turn to prosecuted cases of insider trading. The 
insider trading cases provide additional evidence on whether informed traders use options 




We start by examining all 7,061 SEC litigation releases relating to insider trading between 
January 1, 1999 and August 30, 2014.
20
 Within these cases, we identify 539 news 
announcements that are preceded by illegal trading on insider information (hereafter “insider 
trading”). The cases involve instances in which the illegal trading occurs in options only, stocks 
only, and in both markets. 
In the majority of cases, insiders trade in the stock market (382 of 539 announcements), a 
significant proportion of announcements (157 of 539, or 29%) involve insider trading in the 
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 Several studies examine insider trading in the U.S. stock markets and generally find that insider trading leads to 
more rapid price discovery (e.g., Meulbroek, 1992; Augustin et al., 2014; Ahern, 2017; Kacperczyk and Pagnotta, 
2019).   
20
 SEC litigation releases are obtained from www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases.shtml. Our sample contains a variety 
of different news announcement types including mergers, analyst recommendation changes, and earnings 
announcements. The majority of announcements (85%) contain positive news about the value of the company. 
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options market either exclusively or in addition to trading in the stock market. Closer 
examination of the insider trades and volumes provides further evidence that insiders often take 
advantage of their private information using the options market. In total, 32% of insider trades 
are in options (739 of 2,320). Across all announcements, the average share volume that insiders 
trade in the options market is 22.94% of their total traded volume, or 52.14% when insiders trade 
in both stocks and options. The SEC prosecutions indicate that a meaningful fraction of insider 
trading occurs in the options market. In subsequent analysis, we examine whether options prices, 
and thus the options share of price discovery, reflects trading by insiders.
21
 
Consistent with theoretical predictions, the inherent leverage in options magnifies insider 
traders’ percentage profits. Insider trades in the stock market only earn an average of 24%, 
whereas those that trade in both the stock and options markets earn 39%. In contrast, those that 
trade only in options earn a staggering average return of 353%. The return calculation for stocks 
does not reflect any leverage that traders might be using. For insider trades in stocks to earn a 
similar rate of return as in options, they must leverage their returns by a factor of 15 (353%/24%, 
which is approximately the average omega for our sample of options). 
We examine how insider trading affects the information reflected in prices (i.e., how quotes 
respond to informed trading) and whether price discovery measures can detect the presence of 
insider trading. We have a sample of news announcements (the information on which the 
insiders traded) for 36 stocks, with all necessary data (including 2,031 stock-days, of which 212 
are stock-days known to have illegal insider trading).
22
 If the price discovery metrics detect the 
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 Several studies find that the sample selection bias that arises from examining detected insider trading is small. For 
example, Meulbroek (1992) finds similar results for cases initiated by public complaints and cases initiated by 
exchange referrals. 
22
 To allow for variation per stock, our sample is constructed using stocks that have listed options and episodes of 
insider trading that involve at least six days on which insiders illegally trade in either market. Trades made by 
insiders to close out their positions are considered to be uninformed. In the subsequent analysis, we do not classify 
these trades as illegal insider trades because once the private information held by an insider is revealed to the market 
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presence of insider trading, we would expect higher options price discovery shares when insiders 
trade in the options market only, compared to stock-days in which insiders trade in the stock 
market only, or in which insiders do not trade.  
To test whether the price discovery measures reflect informed trading, we regress them on 
three dummy variables: (1) 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡, which takes the value of one if on that stock-day insider 
trading occurs only in options; (2) 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡, which takes the value of one if insider trading 
occurs only in stocks; and (3) 𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡, which takes the value of one if insider trading occurs in 
both stocks and options. For stock-days with no known insider trading, all three of the dummy 
variables are zero. We also include stock fixed effects and a time trend (𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡). 
Table 5 reports the regression results, using IS, ILS, and ILI as the price discovery measures 
in Models 1, 2, and 3, respectively. The results show that the options IS is lower when informed 
trading occurs in the options market (negative coefficient of 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡) contrary to the 
expectation that these price discovery measures are able to detect the presence of informed 
trading. In contrast, Models 2 and 3 show that the options ILS and ILI are significantly higher 
when insiders trade in options; ILS is 7.12 percentage points higher than at other times and ILI is 
6.14 percentage points higher, holding other factors constant.
23
 The regressions indicate that ILS 
and ILI, but not IS, reveal the presence of insider trading. These findings support the use of ILS 
and ILI as measures of where fundamental information is first impounded into prices. 
 
< Table 5 here > 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
they no longer have an informational advantage. For each insider trading prosecution, we obtain data for that stock, 
starting one month before the first insider trade and ending one month after the last insider trade.  
23
 These results are also robust when controlling for stock volatility. In all three models, we observe the expected 
negative coefficient on 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 . The regressions in which ILI is the dependent variable are effectively “linear 
probability models.” We obtain similar results using probit regression models, which we report in the Internet 
Appendix (see Tables IA.5, IA.7, IA.8, and IA.9). We also obtain similar results when we apply logit 





There are potential limitations in using the insider trading cases to validate the price 
discovery measures. First, the analysis is a test of joint hypotheses: (i) that the insider trades are 
recognized by the market as informed and consequently that insider information is impounded 
into prices, and (ii) that the price discovery measures can detect the market in which the 
information was first reflected in prices. In some cases, prices do not reveal the presence of 
informed traders (e.g., Collin-Dufresne and Fos, 2015), therefore weakening the expected 
relation between insider trading and price discovery measures. Second, the insider trades might 
account for only a small fraction of the total trading and thus the insiders’ impact on prices could 
be small relative to other factors. Third, we observe only detected insider trades that resulted in 
legal action by the SEC. There could be other informed trades, possibly based on the same 
information, occurring in markets other than where the prosecuted insiders traded. It is also 
possible that because options are considerably less liquid than stocks, it is easier for the SEC to 
detect insider trading in options by observing unusual options trading prior to price-sensitive 
announcements. The insider trading detection rate in options might also be higher due to options 
market makers filing complaints with the SEC when they incur significant losses to informed 
traders prior to price-sensitive announcements. For these reasons, the share of prosecuted illegal 
insider trading that occurs in options cannot be directly compared to the options share of price 
discovery. 
 
4.4. Options price discovery around information events 
The previous subsection shows that informed trading occurs in options and their trading is 
reflected in options prices (i.e., it impacts ILS and ILI). Given that informed investors trade at 
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times when they have an informational advantage, such as when new information is generated or 
announced to the market, it is natural to ask whether the role of options in price discovery is 
different around information events than at other times. We address this question using two 
proxies for situations where significant new information enters the market: (1) stock-days when 
insider trading occurs, and (2) stock-days on which price-sensitive news is released. We obtain 
news releases from Thomson Reuters News Analytics (TRNA). We define a stock-day as having 
a price-sensitive news release if: (i) the number of news items on the given day mentioning the 
stock exceeds the median number of news items per stock-year during our sample period, and (ii) 
the average TRNA relevance score for the news on a given stock-day exceeds 0.75.
24
 
Panel A of Table 6 reports that the mean options ILI is 41.04% on days when insiders trade 
on their private information (this estimate is from the sample of 36 stocks with prosecuted 
insider trading, which generally have less active options markets). Using a difference of means 𝑡-
statistic, this ILI estimate is 12.10 percentage points higher than the average options ILI for 
stock-days with no insider trading in our sample of 35 large stocks. Similarly, options ILS is 
14.18 percentage points higher on insider trading stock-days compared to other stock-days. The 
differences in means are statistically significant and large in magnitude, particularly relative to 
the pooled sample means of those measures.  
 
< Table 6 here > 
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 Important news is typically reported across a number of media outlets and therefore criterion (i) helps identify 
important news, avoiding casual mentions of the stock. Criterion (ii) ensures the news is specific to the company, 
which further helps avoid casual mentions of stocks in general market news. TRNA gives each news announcement: 
(a) a discrete sentiment score if it contains good news, no-news, or bad news, and (b) a continuous relevance score 
ranging between zero and one determined by how many times the company is mentioned relative to other companies 
in the news announcement. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of price-sensitive news including 
different thresholds ranging from 0.50 to 0.90 of the average relevance score, considering good news only, and 
considering bad news only. 
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 Panel B of Table 6 shows that the options share of price discovery also increases around 
price-sensitive news releases. The mean options ILI on stock-days with price-sensitive news is 
32.04%, which is a statistically significant 3.33 percentage points higher than stock-days with no 
price-sensitive news. Similarly, ILS is 2.33 percentage points higher on news days. The post-
announcement return drift reported in previous studies suggests that it takes time for investors to 
process the information in public announcements. It is likely that some traders are faster (or more 
accurate) than others in processing public news and our results suggest that a proportion of such 
traders use the options market to maximize their returns.  
 The increase in options ILI and ILS around news releases is not due to an increase in 
sampling variation. The 95% confidence intervals for both mean ILS and mean ILI (generated 
from the bootstrap distribution) are in fact narrower on news stock-days than at other times, 
pointing away from an increase in sampling variation as the driver of the increased values. The 
differences in the average widths of the 95% confidence intervals on news stock-days compared 
to other stock-days are significantly narrower, with t-statistics of -8.50 and -6.28 for ILS and ILI, 
respectively.  
 Using multivariate regressions, we confirm that the increased options share of price 
discovery around price-sensitive news announcements is robust to various controls. We regress 
the price discovery measures on a dummy variable for the release of price-sensitive news 
(𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡), controlling for stock fixed effects, 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹 , 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀, and a time trend. For example, 
Table 7 reports that options ILI is 4.19 percentage points higher around price-sensitive news, 
holding other factors fixed. 
  




Our finding that the options market’s share of price discovery is higher during periods of 
insider trading and price-sensitive news releases reinforces the importance of options in 
impounding new information. Higher options ILI and ILS during such periods indicate that 
options are often the first of the two markets to reflect news or the price impact of informed 
traders. Our findings support the interpretation that the abnormal trading activity previously 





4.5. The determinants of price discovery in the options market 
Our results suggest that options play an important, rather than a negligible, role in price 
discovery, especially around information events, at least in part because informed traders utilize 
options. In this subsection, we investigate why informed traders choose to trade options despite 
their relative illiquidity, and how their trading affects the options market. Given that ILI 
identifies which market is the informational leader and is able to detect the presence of informed 
trading, we use the options ILI as our main measure of the relative amount of informed trading in 
options. We examine how informed traders’ choice of market is affected by relative liquidity, 
volatility, and leverage. We start with OLS panel regressions before estimating two-stage least 
squares (2SLS) instrumental variables (IV) models to address bi-directional causality; namely, 
informed traders might choose to trade in options due to particular market conditions, but their 
choice of market can itself influence those conditions.  
The liquidity hypothesis predicts that informed traders will choose the most liquid market to 
minimize the price impact of their trades and thus maximize the value of their information. 
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Fleming et al. (1996) find support for this hypothesis in stock, futures, and options markets. 
Under the liquidity hypothesis, we would expect a negative (positive) relation between options 
price discovery shares and options bid-ask spreads (options trading volume). 
The uncertainty hypothesis stems from Capelle-Blancard (2001), who models the strategic 
interaction between traders informed about the direction of future stock price movements 
(directional-informed traders) and traders informed about volatility (volatility traders). The 
presence of volatility traders increases options spreads, shifting directional-informed traders 
from the options market to the stock market. Under this hypothesis, uncertainty (proxied by stock 
price volatility) should be negatively related to the amount of price discovery occurring in the 
options market. 
Chakravarty et al. (2004) examine the competing determinants of price discovery in stock 
and options markets. For comparability, we replicate their regressions, using IS to measure price 
discovery and similar explanatory variables, before identifying the determinants of ILI using an 
expanded set of determinants.  
We estimate panel regressions using stock-day observations: 
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 +
𝑖𝑡,  (11) 
where 𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 is the price discovery measure for the options market, 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of the 
time-weighted average quoted bid-ask spread in the options market (averaged across put-call 
pairs) to that of the stock market, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of options omega-adjusted dollar volume 
(summed across put-call pairs) to stock market traded dollar volume, and 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the 
standard deviation of one-minute stock midquote returns. All explanatory variables are in natural 
log form.  
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Table 8 reports the regression results. In Model 1, we find a negative relation between the 
options market IS and options bid-ask spreads. This result is qualitatively similar to Chakravarty 
et al. (2004), who interpret it as support for the liquidity hypothesis—wider options spreads 
discourage informed trading in the options market, which reduces the options market’s 
contribution to price discovery. However, given the evidence that IS is biased downward by 
noise (Yan and Zivot, 2010; Putniņš, 2013; and the simulations reported in Table 2), an 
alternative explanation for this result is that wider options spreads are associated with more noise 
in options prices and thus lower IS due to an increased downward bias. Consistent with this 
alternative interpretation, options ILI and options spreads in Model 3 are positively related (the 
same is true for ILS in Model 2) and highly statistically significant. Economically, Model 3 
implies that a 1% increase in the options relative spread is associated with an increase in ILI that 




< Table 8 here > 
 
The positive relation between the options bid-ask spreads and options’ contribution to price 
discovery is consistent with an adverse selection mechanism. Higher levels of informed trading 
in the options market increase adverse selection risk for options market makers, leading to wider 
options spreads (e.g., Glosten and Milgrom, 1985), yet at the same time the increased informed 
trading in options results in more price discovery in the options market. This finding is also 
consistent with Hu (2014), who shows that option market makers commonly delta-hedge option 
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 In Model 3, the dependent variable is 𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡  and the independent variable is ln (
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛,𝑖𝑡
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘,𝑖𝑡




) is associated with an increase in 𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 of 11.74 ln(1.01) = 0.1168 (with ILI measured on a scale of 
0-100), with that increase being 0.40% of the pooled sample mean of ILI (28.94%). 
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trades in the stock market and the stock market order imbalance from delta-hedging is 
informative about future stock returns.  
Models 2 and 3 also show a significant and positive relation between the relative volume in 
options and options price discovery. This is consistent with a pooling equilibrium in which 
informed traders disguise their trades among those of uninformed traders (Chowdhry and Nanda, 
1991; Easley et al., 1998).  
The coefficient of 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is positive in all specifications with ILI as the dependent 
variable, providing no support for the uncertainty hypothesis. The relation between ILI and 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is consistent with more price discovery occurring in options on more volatile days, 
such as those where insiders trade (see Table 5) and on days in which price-sensitive news is 
released (see Table 7).  
In Models 4 to 6, we use ILI as the dependent variable and examine additional determinants 
of information leadership. Theory suggests that informed traders will be attracted by the leverage 
in options. Our model-free approach to obtaining options-implied stock prices means that we can 
only calculate price discovery for put-call pairs with the same strike price, not individual put and 
call options. In a given pair, the price (and thus leverage) of the put option will usually be 
different to the price (and leverage) of the call option. Therefore, we develop a measure of 
leverage that is applicable to put-call pairs by considering whether the put or the call is more 
likely to be traded by an informed trader: 




,         (12) 
where 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝐶𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑖𝑡 and 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑃𝑢𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the omega of each option (the absolute delta 




 are indicator 
variables that equal one if the daily stock return at 𝑡 + 1 is positive or negative, respectively. If 
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the daily stock return is positive, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 reflects the leverage in the call option, and vice 
versa. This measure is based on the assumption that informed traders with good (bad) news will 
buy call (put) options rather than sell put (call) options. This assumption is supported by the data: 
in 155 of the 157 announcements in which insiders illegally trade in options, insiders buy call or 
put options as their first trade. The direction of the stock’s return is a proxy for whether informed 
trader(s) have good or bad news. For each stock-day, we compute the average of the leverage 
variable for the put-call pairs used in the estimation of the options price discovery measures. 
Under the leverage hypothesis, we expect a positive relation between leverage and options share 
of price discovery.  
Model 4 shows that options contribute more to price discovery when they have higher 
leverage.
26
 This result is consistent with theoretical predictions made by Easley et al. (1998), 
which suggest that informed traders are attracted to the options market by the ability to leverage 
their returns.  
We also include a measure of the relative quoting activity, 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡, defined as the ratio of 
the number of NBBO quote changes in the options market (summing across put-call pairs) to that 
of the stock market. From the earlier descriptive statistics, we know that the average number of 
quote changes per stock-day in options is around a quarter of the corresponding number in 
stocks. Quoting activity in options is likely to increase with the amount of trading activity in 
options (the regression accounts for this by controlling for 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡), but also with greater use 
of autoquotation algorithms by options market makers. Greater use of autoquotation algorithms 
might increase the tendency for options to follow stocks and therefore more frequent quote 
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 Our results are also robust to using different definitions of leverage including the average of the call and put 
option omega, and the maximum of the call or put option omega. All of these estimates are likely to understate the 
effect of leverage because in jointly considering price discovery across many put-call pairs, they take the average 
leverage across multiple pairs of options, which does not precisely identify the leverage of the particular options that 
were the first to reflect new information (a form of measurement error). 
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changes in options might be associated with decreased price discovery. Model 4 shows that more 
frequent quote changes in options (holding options trading volume fixed) are associated with less 
price discovery occurring in options. This result is consistent with our conjecture that greater use 
of autoquotation algorithms increases both quoting activity in options and thereby the tendency 
for options to mechanically follow stocks. 
Several factors determine option leverage, either by affecting the option price relative to the 
stock price or by affecting the option delta. Some of these factors may also affect where 
informed traders choose to trade and thus price discovery for reasons other than leverage. For 
example, informed traders might have a preference for particular maturities, selecting options 
that have expiry just beyond the expected horizon of their information. We test for this using a 
series of dummy variables, 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑎−𝑏, equal to one if the time to expiry is between 𝑎 and 𝑏 days, 
inclusive (options with expiry between 40 and 70 days are the base case). We also examine the 
implied volatility from the Black-Scholes model (𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡), which affects leverage through the 
options price level. Informed traders in the options market might also prefer particular strike 
prices relative to the current stock price—the degree of option “moneyness.” We calculate the 
absolute difference between the underlying stock price and strike price for each put-call pair and 
then average across put-call pairs for each stock-day (𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡). An increase in 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 decreases the moneyness of the call option (if the stock price is less than the 
strike price) or the put option (if the stock price is greater than the strike price). Moneyness and 
leverage are related, but are not identical. Figure IA.4 of the Internet Appendix shows that as the 
stock price increases relative to the strike price, the leverage of put options increases and the 
leverage of call options decreases. The changes in 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡 are linear, while the 
changes in leverage are non-linear.  
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 In Model 5 in Table 8, we replace the 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 variable with its components: strike 
distance, implied volatility, and time to maturity. Strike distance is not statistically significant but 
the sign of the coefficient indicates options that are deeper in or out of the money make a larger 
contribution to price discovery than at-the-money options. Implied volatility is negatively related 
to options price discovery, consistent with a leverage effect—higher implied volatility means 
higher option prices and thus less leverage. The time to maturity dummy variables indicate a 
monotonic tendency for options that are closer to expiry to play a larger role in price discovery. 
This result is consistent with the notion that informed traders in options have fairly short-horizon 
information (such as knowledge of an upcoming announcement) and therefore prefer short-dated 
options, which are cheaper and have higher leverage. Finally, Model 6 shows that the results on 
the determinants of options price discovery are robust to including stock fixed effects and 
additional control variables (𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹 , 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀, and a time trend).  
The endogeneity of options market liquidity presents a potential complication; informed 
traders might choose options when they are relatively liquid, but their trades in options impose 
adverse selection risks on options market makers, which can reduce liquidity (e.g., Easley et al., 
1998). To disentangle these effects, we exploit the exogenous reduction in options tick sizes as 
an instrument for options market liquidity in a 2SLS IV regression framework. The change in 
tick size is expected to decrease options bid-ask spreads by removing a binding constraint on the 
width of the spread. Our measure of relative liquidity is 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡, the ratio of the time-weighted 
average quoted bid-ask spread in the options market to that of the stock market. Under the Penny 
Pilot program, tick sizes for OPRA options exchanges were reduced from $0.05 ($0.10) to $0.01 
($0.05) for options with prices less than (greater than) $3. The reduction in tick sizes occurred in 
a staggered manner on different dates for different options classes. In total, 29 of 35 stocks in our 
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sample had a reduction in tick size on seven separate dates between February 2007 and August 
2010 (six of 35 stocks changed ticker, merged, or delisted prior to the reduction in tick sizes). 
Our instrument is a dummy variable that takes the value of one from the time the options tick 
size is reduced (𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘).  
To be a valid instrument, the reduction in options tick sizes should not directly affect options 
price discovery other than through changes in relative liquidity. While this is likely to be true 
when using ILI as the measure of price discovery, it may be violated when using other price 
discovery metrics due to their sensitivity to noise. For this reason, we focus on ILI.
27
  
In the first stage, we regress 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 on the instrumental variable (IV) and a set of control 
variables including stock fixed effects:  
    𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡.        (13) 
In the second stage, we regress the options ILI on fitted values of relative bid-ask spreads 
(𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ ) obtained from the first stage and the same set of control variables (including stock 
fixed effects): 
𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡.              (14) 




The first-stage regression results in Models 1 and 2 of Table 9 show a significant reduction 
in options bid-ask spreads (relative to stock market spreads) after the reduction in options tick 
sizes.
28
 Models 3 and 4 report results from the second stage. The relation between relative 
options bid-ask spreads (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ ) and options price discovery is statistically indistinguishable 
                                                          
27
 Consistent with this hypothesis, if we instead measure options price discovery using IS (which is sensitive to 
noise) in our 2SLS IV approach we find similar results to Model 1 in Table 8.  
28
 The F-statistics for our instrumental variable exceed one, indicating the instrument is strong (Bound et al., 1995). 
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from zero in both specifications. In contrast to Chakravarty et al. (2004), we conclude that 
liquidity has an insignificant bearing on informed traders’ choice of market. Our findings differ 
due to using ILI rather than IS (thereby avoiding measuring a mechanical relation that occurs 
through the effects of spreads on noise), as well as using an instrumental variable to overcome 
the endogeneity issue. The coefficient on relative spreads falls from a maximum of 11.74 in the 
single-stage OLS models to minimum of 3.22 in the IV regressions. Together, the one-stage OLS 
and 2SLS IV results suggest that informed trading in the options market increases options bid-
ask spreads (e.g., due to adverse selection), but relative liquidity (proxied by the bid-ask spread) 
is not an important determinant of informed traders’ choice of market. 
 
< Table 9 here > 
 
4.6. Options price discovery and price disagreements  
The analysis so far is based on the VECM approach to estimating price discovery shares, 
which is common in the market microstructure literature. An alternative approach introduced by 
Muravyev et al. (2013) is to examine instances of disagreement in the prices of the two markets 
and the subsequent price movements in each of the markets to resolve the disagreement. A 
disagreement is when the bid-ask range of the stock market does not overlap with the implied 
bid-ask range in the options market and the price differential is sufficiently large to imply the 
presence of an arbitrage opportunity. In this subsection, we apply the price disagreement 
approach and compare it to the price discovery shares estimated from the VECM approach.  
A price disagreement event is deemed to have occurred if either of the conditions in 
equation (15) or (16) is satisfied: 
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𝐼𝑃𝑡 > 𝑃𝑡: 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑡(𝐾, 𝑇) −  𝑆𝑡




𝐴𝑠𝑘 ≥ 0.05%,      (15) 
𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡: 𝑆𝑡




𝐵𝑖𝑑 ≥ 0.05%,      (16) 
where 𝐼𝑃𝑡 > 𝑃𝑡 is a disagreement event in which the options-implied-bid price is greater than the 
stock ask price, 𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡 is a disagreement event in which the options-implied-ask price is less 
than the stock bid price, 𝑆𝑡
𝐵𝑖𝑑
 is the stock bid price at time 𝑡, and 𝑆𝑡
𝐴𝑠𝑘
 is the stock ask price. 
The conditions identify instances in which there is a relatively large disagreement between the 
two markets, and an arbitrage opportunity of at least two cents and 5 bps.  
 In the sample of put-call-pairs used in the earlier sections, we identify 904,430 price 
disagreement events, made up of 446,877 𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡 events and 457,553 𝐼𝑃𝑡 > 𝑃𝑡 events. The time 
series of the frequency of price disagreements is correlated with the Market Volatility Index 
(VIX). Prior to 2007, there is an average (median) of one (zero) disagreement per stock-day. This 
number increases to 27 (three) by 2009, before falling to seven (two) disagreements by 2013.  
 The price adjustments in each market following disagreement events contain information 
about the price discovery process. For example, if stocks always drive price discovery during 
disagreement events, we would expect to find that subsequent to a disagreement emerging, 
options prices make 100% of the adjustment to correct the disagreement, effectively “catching 
up” or following the stock price. Conversely, if options always drive price discovery during 
disagreement events, stock prices would adjust to correct the disagreement. Finally, if both 
markets contribute to price discovery during disagreement events, on average, some of the price 




We therefore examine each market’s price adjustment following disagreement events using 
the following VECM: 
∆𝑝𝑡 = 𝛼𝑍𝑡−1 + ∑ 𝑏𝑖∆𝑝𝑡−𝑖
20
𝑖=1 + 𝛾 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡,            (17) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠1𝑡 = {
0           𝑖𝑓         𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡                              
−1        𝑖𝑓        𝐼𝑃𝑡 > 𝑃𝑡 (𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒)
+1        𝑖𝑓        𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡 (𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝)         
             (18) 
𝐷𝑖𝑠2𝑡 = {
0           𝑖𝑓         𝑛𝑜 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡                              
+1        𝑖𝑓         𝐼𝑃𝑡 > 𝑃𝑡  (𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑣𝑒)
−1        𝑖𝑓         𝐼𝑃𝑡 < 𝑃𝑡 (𝑜𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠 𝑡𝑜𝑜 𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑎𝑝)         
                            (19) 
where ∆𝑝𝑡 is the 2 × 1 vector of midquote returns (from options-implied prices and stock prices) 
at a ten-second frequency, 𝑍𝑡−1 is an error correction term, 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡 is the 2 × 1 vector of 
disagreement indicators (𝐷𝑖𝑠1𝑡 in the options price equation and 𝐷𝑖𝑠2𝑡 in the stock price 
equation), and 𝛾 captures how much each market moves to correct a disagreement. We sample 
prices at a lower frequency here (ten seconds as opposed to one second in the rest of the paper) 
because disagreement events typically last more than a second.
29
 We estimate the VECM for 
each stock in each year, omitting overnight returns.
30
 
The adjustment in prices following disagreement events is the sum of two parts: (1) 
adjustment implied by the error correction term (captured by 𝛼), and (2) additional adjustment 
due to the disagreement event (captured by 𝛾 ). To interpret the results, in particular the 
magnitudes of the adjustment coefficients, it is useful to compare them to the typical 
disagreement size during our sample period, which is 7 bps.  
 The results from estimating the VECM (equation (17)) indicate that for the full sample, the 
average price adjustment in the options market in the ten seconds following a typical 7 bps 
                                                          
29
 For example, Muravyev et al. (2013) find that in their sample the median disagreement event durations are 16.4 
and 18.3 seconds for the 𝑃𝑡 > 𝐼𝑃𝑡 and 𝐼𝑃𝑡 > 𝑃𝑡 events, respectively. 
30
 We do this by normalizing the opening stock price to be equal to the previous closing price. 
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disagreement is 3.35 bps, which is statistically significant at the 5% level (see Table C1 in 
Appendix C). This adjustment is made up of 1.17 bps implied by the error correction term [i.e., 𝛼 
multiplied by the typical disagreement size (𝛼𝐷𝑖𝑠)] and a further 2.18 bps implied by the 
coefficient 𝛾. Therefore, the estimated total adjustment in options prices in the ten seconds 
following a disagreement is approximately half (47.86%) of the typical disagreement size.  
 Repeating the same calculations for stock prices, we find that the average adjustment of 
stock prices in the ten seconds following disagreements is 0.51 bps, which is statistically 
significant at the 5% level. This is made up of 0.07 bps implied by the error correction term 
(𝛼𝐷𝑖𝑠) and an additional 0.44 bps due to the disagreement event (𝛾). Therefore the estimated total 
adjustment in stock prices in the ten seconds following a disagreement is approximately 7.29% 
of the typical disagreement size. These results indicate that the majority of the adjustment in 
prices following disagreement events occurs in options, consistent with our overall finding that 
stocks make a larger contribution to price discovery than options. The results also indicate that 
some of the adjustment following disagreement events occurs in stock prices, consistent with the 
notion that options drive some of the price discovery during disagreement events. We would not 
necessarily expect to find options accounting for the same share of price discovery during 
disagreement events and during other times, in particular considering that disagreement events 
represent about 1% of the total sample by time. We find similar results using an alternative 
VECM specification that omits the error correction term and when using a lower (20 second) 
sampling frequency. 
 To better understand the relation between the two approaches (the VECM-based price 
discovery shares and the disagreement approach), we examine the extent to which the post-
disagreement price adjustment magnitudes correlate with the price discovery shares in the pooled 
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sample. First, using the estimates of how much stock and options prices adjust in the ten seconds 
following a disagreement event, we construct a new variable, 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡, which is the ratio of the 
adjustment in stock prices to the adjustment in options prices. Higher values of  𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 
indicate greater adjustments in stock prices following disagreement events, relative to those of 
options prices, which is likely to occur when options contribute more to price discovery. We then 
regress each of the options price discovery shares (IS, ILS, and ILI) on  𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡, controlling for 
a number of other variables including 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡, 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡, 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡, 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡, 
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐹 , 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀, and 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡.  
 Table 10 reports the results of the regressions. Models 2 and 3 show that options price 
discovery shares (ILS and ILI) are positively related to 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 controlling for other factors. 
These results support the notion that when the relative adjustment in stock prices is larger 
following price disagreements, consistent with options making a larger contribution to price 
discovery, the options price discovery shares also tend to be higher. Therefore, the two 
approaches tend to agree about both the variation in options price discovery, and when options 
make a relatively larger or smaller contribution to price discovery.   
 
< Table 10 here > 
 
Finally, we consider the similarities and differences in how the two approaches analyze price 
discovery. The results from the two approaches qualitatively agree on several aspects, but 
produce different quantitative estimates. For example, the estimates of both approaches are 
positively correlated, suggesting that they tend to agree as to when options make a relatively 
larger or smaller contribution to price discovery. Also, both approaches agree that stocks more 
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often lead in reflecting new information, but that options do contribute to price discovery. Where 
they differ is in the quantitative estimates of how much options contribute to price discovery. For 
example, in our sample options ILI estimates that options lead stocks approximately 29% of the 
time, while the analysis of price disagreements suggest that stocks are responsible for about 13% 
of the adjustment following disagreement events (recall that stock price adjustment is consistent 
with options contributing to price discovery).
31
  
There are a few possible reasons we may observe differences in the estimates from the two 
approaches. First, ILI estimates lead-lag relations between the markets using intraday returns 
throughout the whole day, whereas the disagreements approach focuses on particular points in 
time. For example, there are approximately 900,000 price disagreements in our sample with a 
mean duration of around 15 seconds each, implying that disagreements span a total of 
approximately 13.5 million seconds in our sample. There are approximately 1.2 billion seconds 
in our sample in total, implying that options and stock prices disagree about 1% of the time. The 
estimates suggest that when stock and options prices disagree (i.e., 1% of the time), options 
contribute less to price discovery (around 13%) than they do at other times. During other times 
(i.e., 99% of the time), ILI suggests that options lead price discovery 29% of the time. The 
differences in the points in time considered by the two approaches is one way of reconciling the 
estimates from the two approaches—price discovery contributions vary through time (even 
intraday) and the two approaches measure price discovery at different points in time.  
A second factor contributing to the differences in results is that the two approaches consider 
different sets of price movements. The VECM-based price discovery shares explicitly separate 
permanent and temporary price movements. The permanent movements are assumed to reflect 
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 This share of the adjustment is calculated as the ratio of the estimated stock price adjustment (0.51 bps) to the sum 
of the stock price adjustment and options price adjustment (0.51 bps + 3.35 bps). 
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new information entering prices, while the temporary movements can be caused by various 
sources of noise including large uninformed trades, price pressure, pricing errors due to the 
discrete price grid and so on. Price discovery in the VECM approach is measured using only the 
permanent (information driven) price movements. In contrast, the disagreements approach has 
the advantage of being non-parametric, but it does not explicitly separate temporary from 
permanent price movements. Some of the price disagreements could be triggered by temporary 
price changes, caused by strong price pressure or large uninformed orders. Therefore, the two 
approaches also differ in terms of which price movements are counted when estimating which 
market leads the process of price discovery, which could also contribute to the differences in 
estimates. 
Given that both approaches bring additional information about the price discovery process, 
when used together they provide a more complete picture of the nature of price discovery. The 
price disagreement method provides a less parametric approach and focuses on profitable 
opportunities for market participants. However, as price disagreements do not occur often, in 
particular during periods of low volatility, the VECM approach can be used to estimate price 
discovery more generally, including during less volatile periods and at more granular units of 
analysis, such as individual stock-days. Future work might try and capitalize on the advantages 
of both approaches by combining them in a way that gets “the best of both worlds.” 
 
5. Conclusion  
By disaggregating price discovery into two components—the relative speed with which 
information is reflected in prices and relative noise—and using a unique dataset of insider 
trading prosecutions, this paper brings new evidence to the debate about the role of options in 
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price discovery. We find that actively-traded options listed on a sample of large U.S. stocks are 
the first to reflect new information approximately one-quarter of the time, indicating that they 
play an important role in price discovery. Using unique data on prosecuted insider trading, we 
find that around one-third of the time prosecuted insiders trade in options, and when they do, the 
options information leadership indicator (our main measure of options price discovery) is 
significantly elevated. Consistent with theoretical predictions, we show that leverage is one of 
the key factors that attract informed traders to the options market.  
In contrast, traditional price discovery measures do not increase in response to insider 
trading and underestimate the amount of price discovery that occurs in options. Our findings 
indicate that the low options information shares reported in previous studies (as low as 6% in 
recent studies) underestimate the share of price discovery that occurs in options due to their 
relative illiquidity. The low information shares indicate that options prices are noisier than stock 
prices, not that they are unimportant in impounding new information. Our Monte Carlo 
simulations and empirical proxies of relative noise in options prices support these conclusions.  
We also find that options contribute more to price discovery at times when information 
enters the market, such as when insiders trade on advance knowledge of corporate 
announcements and when price-sensitive news is released. Because informed trading creates 
adverse selection risk, options spreads tend to be wider at times when options contribute more to 
price discovery. Our results suggest that the abnormal trading characteristics in options around 
various types of news (reported in a growing number of studies) are at least in part due to 
informed trading.   
Our findings have a number of practical implications. Illegal insider trading is associated 
with substantial costs, including (i) the substantial regulatory resources used in lawmaking, 
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monitoring, and enforcement of insider trading rules [e.g., in 2014 the SEC spent approximately 
$531 million in combating insider trading (SEC, 2013)], and (ii) negative effects on financial 
markets such as damaged investor confidence in the fairness of markets, which can reduce 
investor participation and harm liquidity. A better understanding of insider trading strategies can 
improve the efficiency with which regulatory resources are used. Our findings contribute to this 
understanding by providing insights about where informed traders choose to trade, what 
influences their decisions, and how their trading impacts markets. Given the significant share of 
price discovery occurring in options, regulators should not ignore options markets in their 
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Appendix A: Estimation of price discovery shares 
From the reduced form VECM estimates (equation (7)), we derive the corresponding infinite 
lag VMA representation in structural form (assuming recursive contemporaneous causality 
running from the first through to the fourth price series): 
∆𝑝1,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴1,𝑙 1,𝑡−𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 + ∑ 𝐴2,𝑙 2,𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝐴3,𝑙 3,𝑡−𝑙
∞




𝑙=1    (A.1a) 
∆𝑝2,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐵1,𝑙 1,𝑡−𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 + ∑ 𝐵2,𝑙 2,𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝐵3,𝑙 3,𝑡−𝑙
∞




𝑙=0     (A.1b) 
∆𝑝3,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐶1,𝑙 1,𝑡−𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 + ∑ 𝐶2,𝑙 2,𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝐶3,𝑙 3,𝑡−𝑙
∞




𝑙=0     (A.1c) 
∆𝑝4,𝑡 = ∑ 𝐷1,𝑙 1,𝑡−𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 + ∑ 𝐷2,𝑙 2,𝑡−𝑙 + ∑ 𝐷3,𝑙 3,𝑡−𝑙
∞




𝑙=0  .    (A.1d) 
We obtain the structural VMA coefficients by computing the orthogonalized impulse 
response functions and the (contemporaneously uncorrelated) structural VMA errors ( 1,𝑡 to 4,𝑡) 
by mapping their relation to the reduced form errors. 
The permanent price impacts of shocks to the four prices are easily obtained from the 
structural VMA. For example, a unit shock to the first price ( 1,𝑡 = 1) has a permanent effect on 




 Similarly, the permanent price impacts of shocks to 
the second, third, and fourth prices are given by 𝜃 2 = ∑ 𝐴2,𝑙
∞
𝑙=1 , 𝜃 3 = ∑ 𝐴3,𝑙
∞
𝑙=1 , and 𝜃 4 =
∑ 𝐴4,𝑙
∞
𝑙=1 .  
In Hasbrouck’s (1995) temporary-permanent decomposition, which is based on Stock and 
Watson’s (1988) common trend representation, innovations in the permanent component (the 
efficient price, 𝑚𝑡) are given by: 
∆𝑚𝑡 = 𝜃 1 1,𝑡 + 𝜃 2 2,𝑡 + 𝜃 3 3,𝑡 + 𝜃 4 4,𝑡.        (A.2) 
The variance of the innovations in the efficient price is therefore: 
                                                          
32
 The permanent price impact is the same for all prices, 𝜃 1 = ∑ 𝐴1,𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 = ∑ 𝐵1,𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 = ∑ 𝐶1,𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 = ∑ 𝐷1,𝑙
∞
𝑙=0 , 
because permanent impacts are innovations in the efficient value and the efficient value is common to all prices as 
they refer to the same underlying asset (Hasbrouck, 1995). 
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𝑉𝑎𝑟(∆𝑚𝑡) = 𝑉𝑎𝑟(𝜃 1 1,𝑡 + 𝜃 2 2,𝑡 + 𝜃 3 3,𝑡 + 𝜃 4 4,𝑡)        
= 𝜃 1
2 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 1,𝑡) + 𝜃 2
2 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 2,𝑡) + 𝜃 3
2 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 3,𝑡) + 𝜃 4
2 𝑉𝑎𝑟( 4,𝑡),            (A.3) 
because the structural VMA errors are uncorrelated by construction (contemporaneous 
correlation in the reduced form errors is absorbed in the recursive contemporaneous effects that 
are part of the structural VMA). Hasbrouck (1995) information shares (IS) are then easily 





















.   (A.4) 
The Gonzalo and Granger (1995) component shares (CS) are obtained by normalizing the 



































 .  
(A.5) 
Finally, we calculate the information leadership share (ILS) and information leadership 
indicator (ILI) by extending the approach in Yan and Zivot (2010) and Putniņš (2013) to the case 
of multiple markets. In the two-price case, market 𝑖’s propensity to reflect new information (how 
much market 𝑖’s price responds to an innovation in the efficient price) can be obtained from the 

































2.      
(A.6) 
                                                          
33
 Obtaining the permanent price impacts of the reduced form model is similar to the procedure for the structural 
model, except that simple impulse response functions from the reduced form VECM are used instead of 
orthogonalized impulse response functions. We ensure all permanent price impacts are non-negative so that the CS 
take the range [0,1]. 
34
 𝛽𝑖 can also be equivalently obtained from a regression of market 𝑖’s price innovations (the structural model errors, 
𝑖,𝑡) on the efficient price innovations (∆𝑚𝑡): 𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖∆𝑚𝑡 + 𝜂𝑡. This provides an interpretation of 𝛽𝑖 as the 
proportion of the efficient price innovation that is immediately reflected in the price of market 𝑖. 
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The information leadership indicator for market 𝑖 in the two-price case is one if 𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖 > 0.5 
and zero otherwise. In the four-price case, 𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖 is one if market 𝑖 has the highest ILS of all four 
markets and zero otherwise: 
   𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖 = { 
1      if       𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖 > 𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑘   ∀  𝑘 ≠ 𝑖
0                                        otherwise
.    (A.7) 
The options price discovery measure for a given stock-day is obtained by summing the price 
discovery measures of the valid put-call pairs on that stock-day. For example, if the stock price is 
𝑝1 and the three options-implied stock prices are 𝑝2, 𝑝3, and 𝑝4, then the options IS is given by 
𝐼𝑆2 + 𝐼𝑆3 + 𝐼𝑆4. The options CS, ILS, and ILI are obtained in a similar manner. 
Hasbrouck’s (1995) IS are not unique; they depend on the ordering of the prices in the 
estimation procedure because of the recursive contemporaneous causality assumed to run from 
the first through to the last price series (this assumption is implicit in procedures that use 
Cholesky factorization of the covariance matrix of reduced form errors, and explicit in the 
structural VMA that we present above). We apply the standard approach used in the literature 
and estimate IS (and subsequently ILS and ILI) for each price under all possible orderings of the 
prices. This gives a range of IS values for each price, with the minimum and maximum values 
providing the lower and upper bounds on IS. Following Baillie et al. (2002) and many 
subsequent papers, we take the average of the upper and lower bound to obtain a single IS 
estimate for each price. 
To obtain standard errors for the price discovery measures, we apply a bootstrap procedure 
to every stock-day. The procedure recognizes that the price discovery measures are all calculated 
from the parameter estimates in the reduced form VECM (equation (7)), involving many non-
linear transformations of those parameters. Error in estimating the VECM parameters is passed 
through to the price discovery measures. While the error in the VECM parameter estimates can 
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be quantified with standard approaches, the complexity of the transforms to obtain the price 
discovery measure makes analytical approaches to calculating their standard errors infeasible. 
For each stock-day, after estimating the VECM, the bootstrap procedure simulates 100 sets of 
VECM parameter estimates with random perturbations from the parameter point estimates. The 
perturbations are drawn from multivariate normal distributions with expected value of zero and 
variance-covariance obtained from the variance-covariance matrix of the VECM parameter 
estimates. For each set of perturbed VECM parameter estimates, we calculate the price discovery 
measures following the procedure described in this Appendix. These steps generate a bootstrap 
distribution for each price discovery estimate for each stock-day, as well as distributions for 
quantities such as the mean of the price discovery metrics across multiple stock-days. From the 
bootstrap distributions we quantify the sampling error, for example, by computing percentiles 
and using them as confidence intervals for the price discovery estimate, or by computing the 




Appendix B: What components of price discovery do the empirical metrics capture?  
In this appendix, we describe two sets of analyses that examine the components of price 
discovery captured by the price discovery measures (IS, ILS, and ILI), with particular focus on 
how the metrics are affected by noise. The first set of analyses is based on simulated data; the 
second on empirical data.  
 
B.1. Monte Carlo simulations 
Our aim is to simulate stylized models that reflect U.S. stock and options markets. 
Importantly, to gain insight as to what the price discovery metrics capture, the simulated models 
have to be such that we unambiguously know (by construction) how each market contributes to 
price discovery. Following Hasbrouck (2002) and Putniņš (2013), within a given stock-day, the 
fundamental value of the stock is assumed to follow a random walk, 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝑢𝑡,          𝑢𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑢),               (B.1) 
where 𝑚𝑡 is the fundamental value at time 𝑡, and 𝑢𝑡 is i.i.d. normal. We set 𝜎𝑢 = 1 bps per 
second similar to the average volatility of U.S. stocks (Hendershott et al., 2011). The stock price 
at time 𝑡, 𝑝1,𝑡, tracks the fundamental value with a delay of 𝛿1 periods, and contains noise, 𝜎𝑠1, 
where 𝑠1,𝑡 is i.i.d. normal: 
𝑝1,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡−𝛿1 + 𝑠1,𝑡,         𝑠1,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠1).                  (B.2) 
Options prices follow the Black-Scholes model. They also track the fundamental value, but with 
a different delay of 𝛿2 periods and a different amount of noise, 𝜎𝑠2: 
𝑝𝐶,𝑡 = 𝑚𝑡−𝛿2𝑁(𝑑1) − 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(𝑑2) + 𝑠2,𝑡,               𝑠2,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠2),      (B.3) 
    𝑝𝑃,𝑡 = 𝐾𝑒
−𝑟𝑇𝑁(−𝑑2) − 𝑚𝑡−𝛿2𝑁(−𝑑1) + 𝑠3,𝑡,         𝑠3,𝑡~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑠2),       (B.4) 
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where 𝑝𝐶,𝑡 is the call price at time 𝑡, 𝑝𝑃,𝑡 is the put price, 𝐾 is the strike price, 𝑟 is the 
continuously compounded risk-free rate, 𝑇 is the time-to-maturity, and 𝑁(𝑑𝑖) is the probability 




Therefore, in equations (B.2) to (B.4), 𝛿𝑖 characterizes the speed with which market 𝑖 
reflects new information, and 𝜎𝑠𝑖 characterizes the noise in market 𝑖 (due to illiquidity, the 
discrete price grid, and so on). An additional source of noise in options prices arises from the 
conversion of options prices to options-implied stock prices as per the procedure described in 
Subsection 3.1. 
We assume that on any given day, either the options prices are faster to reflect new 
information (𝛿1 > 𝛿2), or the stock price is faster (𝛿1 < 𝛿2). While price discovery shares are 
unlikely to be fixed over longer periods (e.g., months or years), they are likely to be reasonably 
stable at intraday horizons, which is why prior studies and also our empirical analysis estimates 
price discovery shares separately for each day allowing for variation across days. The parameter 
𝑞, which we vary in our simulations from zero to one in increments of 0.1, is the probability that 
the options prices are faster to reflect new information on a given day. Thus 𝑞 is the proportion 
of the time options lead in price discovery.  
Our choice of model parameters is based on empirical features of stock and options 
markets—our simulations are approximately calibrated to our empirical setting. The cross-
correlations of stock and options one-second midquote returns (see Figure 1) shows that options 
at times lead stocks by up to ten seconds. Consequently, we set the speed differential between 
                                                          
35
 We set 𝐾 such that the options are initially at-the-money; 𝑟 = 1.78%, which is the average federal funds rate 
during our sample period; 𝑇 = 2/12 consistent with our sample selection criteria; and 𝜎 = 20.49%, which is the 
average VIX during our sample period. In unreported results, we obtain similar findings when we simulate option 
prices using away-from-the-money contracts (i.e., where 𝐾 is set 6% lower and higher than the underlying asset 
price). Using put-call parity, we calculate the options-implied stock price using the simulated call and put prices. 
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markets at 𝛿1 = 0, 𝛿2 = 5 for days when the stock price is faster to reflect new information 
(making it five seconds faster) and 𝛿1 = 5, 𝛿2 = 0 for days when the options prices are faster. 
The results are qualitatively similar (and conclusions the same) for larger and smaller differences 
in the relative speed of the two markets. We fix the noise in the stock price at a moderate level 
(𝜎𝑠1 = 5 bps) and vary the noise in options prices through the range 𝜎𝑠2 ∈ {10, … ,25} bps to 
create variation in the relative noise of options across different simulations. These parameters 
reflect the empirical fact that options prices are considerably noisier than stocks on average, but 
that there is variation in the relative noise differences (e.g., options bid-ask spreads are 
approximately five times larger than stock bid-ask spreads in our sample).
36
  
For every one of the 11 × 6 parameter combinations of 𝑞 and 𝜎𝑠2, we simulate 5,000 
samples (each corresponding to a day) of 21,600 time series observations (each corresponding to 
an intraday one-second frequency observation; there are approximately 21,600 seconds in a 
typical U.S. trading day). We then estimate the price discovery measures (IS, ILS, and ILI) on 
each sample, and compute the mean of the price discovery measures across the 5,000 samples. 
Table 2 reports the Monte Carlo simulation results and we discuss the results in Subsection 4.1. 
 
B.2. Empirical measures of noise and their effects on price discovery shares 
Turning to the empirical data, we measure the amount of noise in stock and options prices 
and relate the noise to the (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) differential. Following Gonzalo and Granger (1995), for 
each one-second interval 𝑠, for stock 𝑖, on day 𝑡, we estimate the common efficient price 
(𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑠) as a linear combination of the options and stock prices with the component shares as the 
                                                          
36
 We obtain similar results if we vary options noise through an extended range of {25, … ,40} bps. 
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weights associated with each price. Absolute deviations of a put-call pair’s implied stock price 
from the estimated common efficient price are given by: 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠 = |𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑠 − 𝐶𝐸𝑃𝑖𝑡𝑠| .     (B.5) 
For each stock-day, we average 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑠 across the put-call pairs and the intraday one-
second intervals to obtain a noise measure of options prices, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡. Repeating this 
procedure with the stock price gives 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡. We obtain relative measures of options noise 
by taking the ratio: 
       𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 =
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡+𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡
.           (B.6) 
As an alternative measure of noise, we calculate the standard deviation of the absolute errors in 
option prices: 




Appendix C: Price disagreements in stock and options markets 
 
Table C1. Price disagreements in stock and options markets 
This table reports the estimated adjustment in stock and options prices in the ten seconds following 
price disagreement events. 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 is the typical disagreement size measured in bps. 𝛼𝐷𝑖𝑠 is the 
adjustment in prices in bps following disagreement events implied by the error correction term [i.e., 
𝛼 in equation (17) multiplied by the typical disagreement size]. 𝛾  is the additional adjustment in 
prices in bps due to the disagreement event, given in equation (17). 
(𝛼𝐷𝑖𝑠 + 𝛾 )
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
 is the ratio of the total 
adjustment in prices to the typical disagreement size expressed as a percentage (range 0–100%). 
The sample comprises 35 stocks during the April 17, 2003 to April 17, 2013 period.  
 
 𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒  𝛼𝐷𝑖𝑠  𝛾 
(𝛼𝐷𝑖𝑠 + 𝛾 )
𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒
 
Options 7.00 1.17 2.18 47.86 





Figure 1. Cross-correlations of stock and options returns 
This figure shows the difference in the mean cross-correlations of stock and options returns for stock-days that have 
the highest and lowest ILI estimates (the difference is highest ILI stock-days minus lowest ILI stock-days). The 
cross-correlations (vertical axis) are computed as the correlation of 𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾  and 𝑟𝑡+𝑙
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁for each of the lead/lag 
values (on the horizontal axis) 𝑙 = −10, −9, … + 9, +10, where 𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾  is the midquote stock return in the one-
second interval 𝑡 and 𝑟𝑡+𝑙
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is the average midquote options-implied stock price return (average across put-call 
pairs) in the one-second interval 𝑡 + 𝑙. For example, the cross-correlation difference at lag 𝑙 = −1 of 0.007 (with 
associated 𝑡-statistic of 10) indicates that the correlation between 𝑟𝑡
𝑆𝑇𝑂𝐶𝐾  and 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑂𝑃𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is 0.007 higher on average for 
the high-ILI stock-days compared to the low-ILI stock-days and the difference is statistically significant, implying a 
greater tendency for options returns to lead stock returns when ILI is high. The dotted lines represent 95% confidence 
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Figure 2. Options market price discovery shares through time 
This figure shows the mean options market price discovery shares and mean number of put-call pairs per stock-day 
through time for our sample of 35 stocks. The price discovery shares are: (i) Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆), (ii) 
Yan-Zivot-Putniņš information leadership share (𝐼𝐿𝑆), and (iii) information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼). All price 




















IS ILS ILI # put-call pairs
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑝𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠 (%) 𝑁𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑢𝑡-𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑝𝑎𝑖𝑟𝑠 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
This table reports the descriptive statistics for our sample of 35 stocks and their options between April 17, 2003 and 
April 17, 2013. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 is the daily time-weighted average quoted bid-ask spread in dollars. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 for options is 
the daily traded dollar volume multiplied by the options omega to make it comparable to stock dollar volume and 
summed across valid put-call pairs each stock-day (reported in units of $1,000). 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 for stocks is the daily 
traded dollar volume per stock (in units of $1,000). 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠  is the daily number of changes to the NBBO quotes (for 
options, quote changes are summed across valid put-call pairs each stock-day). 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 is the daily time-weighted 
average midquote price. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 is the daily standard deviation of one-minute stock midquote returns in basis 
points. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 is the option omega, averaged across valid put-call pairs.  
 
Panel A: Sample options 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 
Mean 0.07 10,397 1,345 1.68 15.90 
Median 0.06 2,546 1,087 1.29 13.92 
Std. Dev. 0.05 69,857 1,079 1.39 8.64 
Panel B: Sample stocks 
 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
Mean 0.01 570,401 5,276 40.52 7.78 
Median 0.01 378,922 2,781 30.79 6.38 
Std. Dev. 0.01 543,890 7,219 34.40 4.76 
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Table 2. Monte Carlo simulations of options price discovery shares 
This table reports means of options information shares estimated on simulated data. Panels A, B, and C report results 
for (i) Hasbrouck information shares (𝐼𝑆), (ii) Yan-Zivot-Putniņš information leadership shares (𝐼𝐿𝑆), and (iii) 
information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼), respectively. All price discovery measures are expressed as percentages 
(range 0–100%) and rounded to the nearest percent. The simulated data for stock and options prices are generated 
using the model described in Appendix B. Rows correspond to the probability (𝑞) that in a given sample 
(representing a day), options lead stocks (e.g., for the row 𝑞 = 0.7, options lead stocks approximately 70% of the 
time). Columns correspond to different values of the noise (𝜎𝑠2) in options prices (the noise in stock prices is held 
constant). For every parameter combination (every cell in the table), we simulate 5,000 samples (each sample 
representing a day) of 21,600 time-series observations (representing intraday one-second frequency observations), 
estimate the options price discovery shares on each sample, and compute the mean across the 5,000 samples. Bold is 
used to indicate price discovery share estimates that are greater than 50%. 
 
Panel A: IS metric 𝜎𝑠2                                                            
𝑞 10 13 16 19 22 25 
0 02 01 01 01 01 00 
0.1 05 03 02 02 01 01 
0.2 09 06 04 03 02 02 
0.3 12 08 06 04 03 03 
0.4 15 10 07 05 04 03 
 0.5 19 13 09 07 05 04 
0.6 22 15 10 08 06 05 
0.7 26 17 12 09 07 05 
0.8 29 19 14 10 08 06 
0.9 32 22 15 11 09 07 
1 36 24 17 12 09 07 
Panel B: ILS metric 𝜎𝑠2                                                            
𝑞 10 13 16 19 22 25 
0 13 14 14 15 15 16 
0.1 20 20 21 21 22 22 
0.2 27 27 27 27 28 28 
0.3 33 33 34 34 34 35 
0.4 40 40 40 40 40 41 
0.5 47 47 46 47 47 47 
0.6 53 53 53 53 53 53 
0.7 60 60 59 59 59 59 
0.8 67 66 66 66 65 65 
0.9 74 73 72 72 72 72 
1 80 79 79 78 78 78 
Panel C: ILI metric 𝜎𝑠2                                                            
𝑞 10 13 16 19 22 25 
0 00 00 00 00 00 01 
0.1 10 10 10 10 10 10 
0.2 20 20 20 20 20 21 
0.3 30 30 30 30 30 30 
0.4 40 40 40 40 40 40 
0.5 50 50 50 50 50 50 
0.6 60 60 60 60 60 60 
0.7 70 70 70 70 70 70 
0.8 80 80 80 80 80 80 
0.9 90 90 90 90 90 90 
1 100 100 100 100 100 100 
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Table 3. The effect of noise on options price discovery measures 
This table reports estimates of how options price discovery measures are impacted by noise. The options price 
discovery measures are the information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡) and the Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡). We 
use several measures of the noise in options prices. 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡  (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡) is the mean absolute difference 
between the options-implied stock price (stock price) and the estimated common efficient price. 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the 
sum of 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡  and 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  (𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡) is the ratio of 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡  
(𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡) to 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑖𝑡 . 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of the time-weighted average quoted options spread 
to the sum of the options and stock bid-ask spreads. 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of the options tick size to the sum 
of the options and stock tick sizes. Panel A reports the means of 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  and 𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  for 
deciles of the (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) differential. Panel B reports the coefficient estimates from the following regression of 
stock-day observations: 
(𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡 − 𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 .  
𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡 is 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  in Model 1, 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  in Model 2, and 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖𝑡  in 
Model 3. 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹  and 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀 are dummy variables equal to one following the removal of the grandfathering 
provision and removal of the option market-maker exemption, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a linear time trend. The 
sample comprises 35 stocks during the April 17, 2003 to April 17, 2013 period. Standard errors are clustered both by 
stock and date and 𝑡-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A: Decile sort by (𝑰𝑳𝑰𝒊𝒕 − 𝑰𝑺𝒊𝒕) 
𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑙𝑒  𝑁 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡  𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖𝑡 
1 5,471 0.52 0.48 
2 5,471 0.67 0.33 
3 5,472 0.72 0.28 
4 5,471 0.76 0.24 
5 5,472 0.80 0.20 
6 5,471 0.84 0.16 
7 5,472 0.90 0.10 
8 5,471 0.92 0.08 
9 5,472 1.00 0.00 
10 5,471 1.00 0.00 
Panel B: Determinants of (𝑰𝑳𝑰𝒊𝒕 − 𝑰𝑺𝒊𝒕) 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -156.50 -77.70 -53.52 
 (-24.97)*** (-6.74)*** (-4.46)*** 
𝑁𝑜𝑖𝑠𝑒𝑀𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝑡  184.40 69.32 38.30 
 (48.58)*** (8.16)*** (6.02)*** 
𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹  3.80 4.87 5.98 
 (3.74)*** (2.78)*** (3.20)*** 
𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀 -2.15 -12.67 -13.62 
 (-2.95)*** (-7.66)*** (-7.43)*** 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 3.06 6.26 6.80 
 (4.38)*** (5.05)*** (4.84)*** 
R2 (%)  49.79 5.22 4.60 





Table 4. Options market price discovery shares 
This table reports options market price discovery shares for our sample of 35 stocks between April 17, 2003 and 
April 17, 2013. The price discovery shares are: (i) Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆), (ii) Yan-Zivot-Putniņš 
information leadership share (𝐼𝐿𝑆) and (iii) information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼). All price discovery measures are 
expressed as percentages (range 0–100%). 𝑈𝑀𝐿 is the difference between the upper and lower bound estimates for 
𝐼𝑆. 𝑁 is the number of stock-day observations and differs across tickers because (i) when a stock changes ticker, is 
acquired or is de-listed, it is removed from our sample, and (ii) not all stock-days have valid put-call pairs that 
satisfy the sampling criteria in Section 2. CI is a bootstrapped 95% confidence interval. 𝜎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 is the standard 
deviation of the price discovery estimates across all stock-days. 𝜎  is the standard deviation of measurement error. 
𝜎𝑃𝐷 is the lower bound of the standard deviation of true variation (not measurement error) in the price discovery 
measure across stock-days.  
 
Panel A: Pooled sample descriptive statistics 
 𝑁 𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝐼 𝑈𝑀𝐿 
Mean  54,714 11.84 36.75 28.94 1.74 
CI  54,714 (3.99, 39.43) (26.82, 56.29) (25.90, 44.58)  
Median  54,714 8.01 14.04 0.00 1.08 
Panel B: Decomposition of the variance in price discovery estimates 
 𝑁 𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝐼  
𝜎𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙  54,714 12.50 40.56 45.17  
𝜎   54,714 8.86 7.37 4.67  
𝜎𝑃𝐷  54,714 8.81 39.89 44.93  
Panel C: Pooled sample descriptive statistics by ticker 
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑁 𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝐼 𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘𝑒𝑟 𝑁 𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝐼 
AIG 1,911 12.16 38.33 30.35 HD 1,923 10.70 32.77 24.17 
AMAT 1,299 10.20 34.60 27.68 IBM 1,907 10.91 37.18 28.90 
AMGN 1,625 12.60 41.58 36.00 INTC 1,203 11.54 21.44 13.88 
AMR 1,928 14.65 40.10 29.02 JPM 1,880 10.15 31.05 23.56 
AMZN 1,586 7.94 35.70 31.15 KLAC 1,651 8.97 52.18 47.12 
AOL 90 18.41 43.19 27.22 MMM 2,222 11.37 47.74 41.13 
BMY 1,819 11.30 31.25 22.62 MO 2,063 13.58 48.55 40.45 
BRCM 1,493 7.96 40.19 35.43 MSFT 1,409 11.20 40.05 34.39 
C 1,701 12.08 33.26 25.22 MWD 475 9.15 36.19 23.37 
COF 2,403 10.61 42.36 34.33 ORCL 1,449 10.67 31.72 24.29 
CPN 388 18.00 50.16 42.65 PFE 1,445 13.40 29.24 20.80 
CSCO 1,331 11.96 26.60 18.63 QCOM 1,437 8.73 31.66 26.55 
DELL 1,424 11.52 28.10 20.86 QLGC 1,915 14.26 42.12 32.98 
EBAY 1,565 9.25 33.31 27.80 SBC 307 9.17 36.40 27.20 
EMC 2,342 15.50 32.10 20.64 TYC 2,054 14.93 40.72 31.99 
F 1,984 15.77 30.60 20.56 XLNX 1,337 11.54 38.95 32.87 
GE 1,841 12.65 31.94 22.98 XOM 1,658 10.82 35.88 29.07 





Table 5. Options market price discovery around SEC insider trading prosecutions 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression using stock-day observations: 
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 .  
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the price discovery measure for the options market using the Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 1, 
Yan-Zivot-Putniņš information leadership share (𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 2, and information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡) in 
Model 3. 𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable equal to one if illegal insider trading occurs in the options market only, 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable equal to one if illegal insider trading occurs in the stock market only, and 𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡 
is a dummy variable equal to one if illegal insider trading occurs in both the stock and options markets. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  is a 
linear time trend. The sample comprises 36 stocks in which insiders were successfully prosecuted for illegal trading 
between January 1, 1999 and August 30, 2014. For each announcement we take one month before the first insider 
trade, one month after the last insider trade, and all stock-days in between to give a sample that includes days with 
and without illegal insider trades. Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date and 𝑡-statistics are reported in 









𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  27.51 78.98 35.33 
 (0.58) (1.24) (0.92) 
𝑂𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡  -3.93 7.12 6.14 
 (-1.60) (2.77)*** (2.14)** 
𝑆𝑡𝑜𝑐𝑘𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡   -2.20 -0.56 -1.34 
 (-0.91) (-0.15) (-0.33) 
𝐵𝑜𝑡ℎ𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡   5.77 7.34 6.41 
 (1.11) (0.95) (0.64) 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  0.59 -5.71 -1.80 
 (0.09) (-0.68) (-0.36) 
R2 (%)  16.04 8.20 6.30 




Table 6. Options market price discovery around information events 
This table reports options price discovery shares around information events. The price discovery shares are: (i) 
Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆), (ii) Yan-Zivot-Putniņš information leadership share (𝐼𝐿𝑆), and (iii) information 
leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼). All price discovery measures are expressed as percentages (range 0–100%). 𝑁 is the 
number of stock-day observations. 𝐷𝑖𝑓𝑓 is the difference in mean options price discovery during information events 
(insider trading stock-days in Panel A and price-sensitive news in Panel B) and other non-information times (stock-
days that do not have the corresponding type of information event). The 𝑡-statistic is the Satterthwaite 𝑡-statistic for 
the difference in means. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels. In Panel A, 
the information events are the 212 stock-days that are known to have illegal insider trading, which occur in 36 
stocks between January 1, 1999 and August 30, 2014. In Panel B, the information events are the 3,930 stock-days in 
our sample for which there is a price-sensitive news release.  
 
Panel A: Options price discovery during illegal insider trading 
 𝑁 𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝐼 
Mean 212 25.09 50.93 41.04 
Difference 54,714 13.25 14.18 12.10 
𝑡-statistic   54,714 7.91*** 5.06*** 3.57*** 
Panel B: Options price discovery during price-sensitive news releases 
 𝑁 𝐼𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝑆 𝐼𝐿𝐼 
Mean 3,930 11.32 38.92 32.04 
Difference 50,784 -0.56 2.33 3.33 





Table 7. Options market price discovery during price-sensitive news releases 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression using stock-day observations: 
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 .  
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the price discovery measure for the options market using the Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 1, 
Yan-Zivot-Putniņš information leadership share (𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 2, and information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡) in 
Model 3. 𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡  is a dummy variable equal to one when price-sensitive news relating to the stock is released. A 
stock-day has a price-sensitive news release if: (i) the number of news items on the given day mentioning the given 
stock exceed the median number of news releases per stock-year during our sample period, and (ii) the average 
relevance score for the news on a given stock-day exceeds 0.75. 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹 and 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀  are dummy variables equal to 
one following the removal of the Grandfathering provision and removal of the option market-maker exemption, 
respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a linear time trend. The sample comprises 35 stocks during the period April 17, 2003 to 
April 17, 2013. Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date and 𝑡-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, 









𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  18.82 29.38 2.91 
 (7.64)*** (5.13)*** (0.35) 
𝑁𝑒𝑤𝑠𝑖𝑡   -0.58 3.50 4.19 
 (-2.49)** (5.13)*** (5.51)*** 
𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹   -2.27 -5.29 0.15 
 (-4.87)*** (-4.03)*** (0.09) 
𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀  3.84 -10.28 -13.64 
 (8.19)*** (-7.65)*** (-9.01)*** 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 -1.23 2.24 4.77 
 (-3.38)*** (2.56)** (3.76)*** 
R2 (%)  3.92 4.65 3.69 





Table 8. Determinants of price discovery 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression using stock-day observations: 
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 .  
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the price discovery measure for the options market using the Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 1, Yan-
Zivot-Putniņš information leadership share (𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 2, and information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡) in Models 3 to 
6. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of the time-weighted average quoted bid-ask spread in the options market to that of the stock 
market. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of options omega-adjusted dollar volume to stock dollar volume. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡 is the standard 
deviation of one-minute stock midquote returns. 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of the number of NBBO quote changes in the options 
market to that of the stock market. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the omega of the call option (if the next day’s stock return is positive) or 
the omega of the put option (if the next day’s stock return is negative). 𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the absolute difference 
between the underlying stock price and the options strike price. 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡  is the implied volatility from the Black-Scholes 
model. 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑎−𝑏  is a dummy variable equal to one if the time to expiry is between 𝑎 and 𝑏 days, inclusive (options with 
expiry between 40 and 70 days are the base case). 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹  and 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀 are dummy variables equal to one following the 
removal of the Grandfathering provision and removal of the option market-maker exemption, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  is a 
linear time trend. All explanatory variables are in natural log form (except dummy variables). The sample comprises 35 
stocks during the period April 17, 2003 to April 17, 2013. Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date and 𝑡-















𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -17.57 18.60 41.47 30.66 37.29 14.43 
 (-4.05)*** (2.16)** (3.99)*** (2.99)*** (4.58)*** (1.13) 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  -0.09 13.04 11.74 7.22 7.45 7.83 
 (-0.16) (10.17)*** (7.33)*** (5.28)*** (5.64)*** (5.80)*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.59 1.09 1.34 0.78 0.55 0.32 
 (-3.95)*** (3.15)*** (3.37)*** (1.99)** (1.42) (0.75) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  -3.30 -1.32 2.31 2.26 3.55 4.36 
 (-6.06)*** (-1.18) (1.73)* (1.80)* (2.96)*** (4.19)*** 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡    -4.33 -3.72 -2.52 
    (-5.01)*** (-4.22)*** (-3.09)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡     2.59  2.64 
    (3.10)***  (3.47)*** 
𝑆𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑘𝑒𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖𝑡      0.76  
     (1.39)  
𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡       -4.11  
     (-1.64)*  
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
0−9      6.10  
     (3.34)***  
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
10−19      4.13  
     (1.93)*  
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
20−29      3.14  
     (1.81)*  
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
30−39      1.98  
     (1.80)*  
𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹        0.73 
      (0.26) 
𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀       -7.30 
      (-3.89)*** 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡      4.41 
      (3.36)*** 
R2 (%)  2.13 4.06 2.83 3.43 3.50 5.41 
Fixed Effects None None None None None Stock 
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Table 9. Two-stage least-squares IV regressions estimating the impact of liquidity on price discovery 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the first and second stages of an instrumental variables model. The first 
stage models (Models 1 and 2) use the reduction in options tick sizes (due to the Penny Pilot Program) as an 
instrument for the relative level of liquidity in options (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡 , the ratio of the time-weighted average quoted bid-
ask spread in the options market to that of the stock market). 𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘 is a dummy variable equal to one after the 
reduction in the options tick size. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of options omega-adjusted dollar volume to the stock dollar 
volume. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the standard deviation of one-minute stock midquote returns. 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of the 
number of NBBO quote changes in the options market to that of the stock market. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the omega of the 
call option (if the next day’s stock return is positive) or the omega of the put option (if the next day’s stock return is 
negative). 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹  and 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀 are dummy variables equal to one following the removal of the grandfathering 
provision and removal of the option market-maker exemption, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a linear time trend. The 
second stage models (Models 3 and 4) regress 𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡  (the options market information leadership indicator for stock 𝑖 
on day 𝑡) on the fitted value of options market liquidity (𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡̂ ) and control variables. All variables are in natural 
log form (except dummy variables). The sample comprises 35 stocks during the period April 17, 2003 to April 17, 
2013. Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date and 𝑡-statistics are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 











𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  53.70 -63.66 30.14 15.52 
 (1.88)* (-2.28)** (2.83)*** (1.18) 
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑇𝑖𝑐𝑘  -62.14 -57.03   
 (-7.58)*** (-6.40)***   
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡̂     3.22 4.81 
   (1.03) (1.44) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  -3.79 -3.76 0.29 0.21 
 (-7.23)*** (-7.54)*** (0.67) (0.49) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  -13.41 -13.16 2.51 3.81 
 (-4.02)*** (-3.82)*** (1.82)* (3.25)*** 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  -22.85 -23.51 -5.27 -3.60 
 (-10.11)*** (-8.68)*** (-3.80)*** (-2.61)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  -14.05 -14.28 2.23 2.11 
 (-4.44)** (-4.58)** (3.22)*** (2.50)** 
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐹    -4.14  -0.20 
  (-0.96)**  (-0.08) 
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀    -0.11  -7.39 
  (-0.03)  (-3.88)*** 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡  -1.21  4.21 
  (-0.58)  (3.11)*** 
R2 (%)  78.03 78.08 4.80 5.10 




Table 10. Relation between options price discovery shares and price adjustments following disagreement events 
This table reports coefficient estimates from the following regression using stock-day observations: 
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽1𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛾𝑗
 
𝑗 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐷𝑒𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑠𝑗,𝑖𝑡 + 𝑖𝑡 .  
𝑃𝐷𝑖𝑡  is the price discovery measure for the options market using the Hasbrouck information share (𝐼𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 1, the 
Yan-Zivot-Putniņš information leadership share (𝐼𝐿𝑆𝑖𝑡) in Model 2, and the information leadership indicator (𝐼𝐿𝐼𝑖𝑡) in 
Models 3. 𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of adjustment in stock prices to the adjustment in options prices in the ten seconds 
following price disagreement events. 𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of the time-weighted average quoted bid-ask spread in the 
options market to that of the stock market. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  is the ratio of options omega-adjusted dollar volume to stock 
dollar volume. 𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the standard deviation of one-minute stock midquote returns. 𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡 is the ratio of the 
number of NBBO quote changes in the options market to that of the stock market. 𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡 is the omega of the call 
option (if the next day’s stock return is positive) or the omega of the put option (if the next day’s stock return is 
negative). 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝐺𝐹  and 𝐷𝑉𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀 are dummy variables equal to one following the removal of the Grandfathering provision 
and removal of the option market-maker exemption, respectively. 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 is a linear time trend. All explanatory 
variables are in natural log form (except dummy variables). The sample comprises 35 stocks during the period April 17, 
2003 to April 17, 2013. Standard errors are clustered both by stock and date and 𝑡-statistics are reported in parentheses. 









𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑝𝑡  -6.29 22.88 15.10 
 (-1.08) (2.53)** (1.21) 
𝐴𝑑𝑗𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑡 -0.40 2.82 3.65 
 (-0.65) (2.26)** (2.54)** 
𝑆𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑖𝑡  1.82 9.77 7.77 
 (1.55) (8.13)*** (5.65)*** 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑢𝑚𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.20 0.32 0.31 
 (-1.87)* (0.93) (0.71) 
𝑉𝑜𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡  -3.20 1.62 4.46 
 (-4.93)*** (1.84)* (4.40)*** 
𝑄𝑢𝑜𝑡𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑡  2.19 0.38 -2.38 
 (5.46)*** (0.51) (-2.95)*** 
𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖𝑡  -0.20 1.39 2.59 
 (-0.61) (1.83)* (3.40)*** 
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝐺𝐹   1.24 -2.61 0.49 
 (1.81)* (-1.17) (0.17) 
𝐷𝑉𝑖𝑡
𝑂𝑀𝑀   1.07 -6.87 -7.37 
 (1.92)* (-3.97)*** (-3.92)*** 
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑡 -1.24 2.29 4.46 
 (-3.54)*** (2.45)** (3.43)*** 
R2 (%)  6.73 6.11 5.46 
Fixed Effects Stock Stock Stock 
 
